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ABSTRACT 
 
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) is among the most dangerous 
type of flying in the United States today.  In 2008 it was safer to fly medical evacuation 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan than in the Continental United States.  This study is 
designed to test whether the financial performance of the local base and a hyper mission 
orientation have a negative effect on aeronautical decision making among HEMS crews. 
A Likert type survey was administered to HEMS pilots and medical crews to 
ascertain their thoughts and feelings regarding the two questions under investigation.  
While the data clearly showed that poor financial performance at the base level and an 
acute desire to complete the mission do not have a negative effect on aeronautical 
decision making among HEMS crews, it did reveal a distinct divide among attitudes 
between pilots and medical crews. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS) is among the most dangerous 
type of flying in commercial aviation today.  In 2008 there were twelve accidents and 
twenty nine fatalities (NTSB, 2009).  This compared with twelve aviation related 
fatalities for the entire United States Army during the same period (US Army, 2011).  In 
2008 it was safer to fly medical evacuation missions in Iraq than in the continental United 
States.  It is important to note that these military accidents occurred at a time when the 
United States military was involved in two major wars and experiencing an operational 
tempo “five times” greater than would be expected during peacetime (Army News 
Service, April 25, 2011).  
While 2008 was record-breaking, it was not an aberration.  In 2007 being a 
crewmember aboard a HEMS aircraft bypassed commercial fishing as the most 
dangerous occupation in America (Bluman, 2009).  Between 1972 (the year the first 
civilian HEMS program in the United States began operating) and 2008 there were 264 
HEMS accidents involving 794 individuals and 264 fatalities (Blumen, 2009).  Between 
1988 and 1997 HEMS averaged 5 accidents per year.  From 1998 to 2008 this number 
exploded to 12.4 accidents per annum (Blumen, 2009).   
HEMS earned its position as one of the most dangerous occupations in America 
because the vast majority of fatalities were among crew members, not patients.  Over 
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50% of all HEMS accidents occur with no patient on board the aircraft (NTSB, 
September 24, 2009). 
The reasons for this dismal safety record are multifaceted and complex.  There is 
no one universally accepted explanation for the large number of accidents and fatalities.  
This author will argue the financial pressures facing HEMS operators, as well as the 
belief that HEMS operations may be the difference between life and death (a condition 
referred to as the Kelly effect, after the “Father of Dust-off,” Vietnam medical evacuation 
pilot Major Charles L. Kelly) combine to negatively influence aeronautical decision 
making among HEMS pilots and medical crews. 
Framing the Problem 
The National Transportation Board (NTSB) has convened no less than three 
formal public hearings and roundtable discussions to address HEMS safety issues and 
make recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).   
In 1988, the Board adopted a Safety Study, Commercial Emergency 
Medical Service Helicopter Operations, which reviewed 59 HEMS 
accidents that occurred from 1978 through 1986. From that study, the 
Board issued 19 safety recommendations to the FAA, the National 
Weather Service, and two associations … The late 1990s and early 2000s 
saw a rapid growth of HEMS operations and the number of accidents 
began to rise. Prompted by this rise, the NTSB completed a special 
investigation report on Emergency Medical Services Operations in January 
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2006. This report analyzed 55 EMS accidents (41 of which were HEMS 
accidents and 14 airplane EMS accidents) that had occurred during the 
previous 3 years, claiming 54 lives; of these, 39 fatalities occurred during 
HEMS operations. Analysis of the accidents indicated that 29 of 55 
accidents could have been prevented with corrective actions identified in 
the report … Immediately following adoption of the 2006 special 
investigation report, the number of HEMS accidents decreased. In 
calendar year 2006, 3 fatal HEMS accidents occurred with a total of 5 
fatalities. The following year, there were 2 fatal HEMS accidents with a 
total of 7 fatalities, but in calendar year 2008, there were 8 fatal HEMS 
accidents, with a total of 29 fatalities … Prompted by this recent rise in the 
number of fatal HEMS accidents, the Safety Board held a 4-day public 
hearing this past February to address the issues associated with HEMS 
safety (NTSB September 1, 2009). 
 
HEMS apologists have sought to explain away the increase in accidents as a 
function of flight time.  They argue that there is a linear relationship between flight hours 
and accident rate.  Dick Wright, a pilot writing in Rotor magazine (2005) argued that “the 
number of lives that are unfortunately lost as a result of accidents during HEMS 
operations remains truly low when the total scale of operations is considered … yes, the 
number of HEMS accidents has increased, but is this due to a failure of safety within the 
industry, or is it perhaps due to an increase in flight operations and thus greater exposure 
to risk?” (pp. 6).  
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This argument is overly simplistic and begs the evidence generated by the United 
States Army in Iraq and Afghanistan.  During the past decade, the Army’s aviation 
related accident rate has been remarkably stable, despite the crushing operational tempo.  
In fact, between 2001 and 2010, the Army’s total aviation related accident rate (Class A, 
B, & C) has actually decreased from 10.2 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2001 to 
7.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours in 2010 (US Army, 30 April 2011). 
This is in sharp contrast to the civilian HEMS community.  The NTSB’s Special 
Investigative Report on Emergency Medical Services Operations (2006) clearly shows 
that not only has the total number of accidents increased during the past two decades, but 
the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours has increased as well.  “Although the 
number of flight hours flown by EMS helicopter operations has increased from about 
162,000 in 1991 to an estimated 300,000 in 2005, the average accident rate has also 
increased from 3.5 accidents per 100,000 flight hours between 1992 and 2001 to 4.5 
accidents per 100,000 flight hours between 1997 and 2001” (NTSB, January 25, 2006, p. 
vii).  Likewise, the FAA found that “the number of HEMS accidents nearly doubled 
between the mid-1990s and the HEMS industry’s rapid growth period from 2000-2004.  
There were nine accidents in 1998, compared with 15 in 2004, five of which resulted in 
17 fatalities” (FAA, June 8, 2010).   
If the relationship between flight time and accidents was linear, there would be no 
concurrent increase in the number of accidents per 100,000 flight hours.  As these data 
clearly shows, factors other than total flight time are responsible for civilian HEMS 
accidents. 
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The HEMS Operational Environment. 
The HEMS flight environment is unique.  “The pressure to safely and quickly conduct … 
operations in various environmental conditions … makes EMS operations inherently 
dangerous” (NTSB, January 25, 2006, p. vii).  Off airport operations, low altitude flight 
environment, remote and/or challenging locations, spotty or inaccurate weather data 
along the route of flight, and little or no warning before mission dispatch are all factors 
which add to the complexity of HEMS flying (Zuccaro, 2009). 
In its Notice of Proposed Rule Making (October 12, 2010), the FAA summed up 
the dangers facing HEMS operations: “Helicopter air ambulance operations present 
several unique operating characteristics that make them distinct from other types of part 
135 helicopter operations. Such operations are often time-sensitive and crucial to getting 
a critically ill or injured patient to a medical facility as efficiently as possible … Remote-
site landings [also] pose additional challenges. These remote sites are often unfamiliar to 
a pilot and, unlike an airport or heliport, may contain hazards such as trees, buildings, 
towers, wires, and uneven terrain” (p. 62642). 
While there are many factors which make the HEMS flight environment 
distinctive, none are in and of themselves prohibitive.  Rather, it is the accumulation of 
factors which result in unsafe flying conditions.  Because of this, there is no single 
“Silver Bullet” that will result in a dramatic decrease in the HEMS accident rate (NTSB, 
January 25, 2006; September 1, 2009).  Since the problem is multifaceted, the solution 
must be as well. 
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After an extensive review of HEMS accidents that occurred between 2002 – 2008, 
the NTSB determined the main causes of HEMS accidents were “controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT), inadvertent operation into instrument meteorological conditions and pilot 
spatial disorientation/lack of situational awareness in night operations” (FAA, June 8, 
2010).  All three of these primary causes can be accurately categorized as human error.  
“In two NTSB studies … the pilot was cited as a cause or factor in more than 64 percent 
of rotorcraft accidents … [with] decision/judgment errors accounting for 41 percent of 
the pilot-error accidents” (Harris, 1994).  Likewise, a study of accidents by Bell 
Helicopter involving their aircraft found “poor judgment was the common factor in all 
human-error accidents (Harris, 1994). 
In an appendix to its 2006 Special Investigation Report, the NTSB described the 
problem this way: 
The HEMS role is a very demanding and time critical/mission 
oriented operation … ‘soft skills’ often refers to proficiencies that 
go beyond technical knowledge and psychomotor skills necessary 
to operate a helicopter.  Soft skills are often the first line of defense 
… against accidents caused by lapses in human performance.  Soft 
skills include adherence to standard operating procedures, decision  
making, judgment, air medical resource management (AMRM) 
(Similar to CRM), and professionalism.  These skills are not easily 
or quickly conveyed in training programs but are developed 
through the continuing commitment of corporate managers, 
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trainers, pilots, mechanics, and medical staff (NTSB, January 25, 
2006, Appendix D, p. 33). 
The majority of HEMS accidents occur during low visibility conditions – at night 
or during inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). According 
to the Government Accountability Office (2007) “Available data confirm that air 
ambulance accidents are often related to their unique operating environment. For 
example, fatal crashes involving air ambulances occur most often at night, and air 
ambulance helicopters are four times more likely to have weather-related crashes than 
helicopters used by other operators flying under the same set of regulations [Part 135]. 
Industry Response to the Crisis 
The Commission on Accreditation of Medical Transport Services (CAMTS) 
standards require that certified programs adhere to a “3 to go, 1 to say no” philosophy.  
Under this system each member of the crew is equally responsible for the “go/no go” 
decision.  The company, via written policy and procedures, guarantees that no employee 
will be penalized for refusing to take a flight they feel would jeopardize their safety. 
HEMS missions are usually conducted under conditions that are much stricter 
than traditional Part 135 operations.  Weather and visibility minimums are greater than or 
equal to those required by the FAA.  For CAMTS certified programs, minimums are 
1000 ft ceilings and three mile visibility for day flight and 1000 ft ceilings and five mile 
visibility at night.  Air medical crew comfort levels are often much higher.  Ceilings 
below 2000 – 3000 feet are routinely rejected.   
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Additional safeguards in place include the development and staffing of an 
Emergency Operations Centers (EOC), Air Medical Resource Management (AMRM) for 
all flight crew members, night vision equipment, more conservative fuel minimums, and 
conducting all aspects of a flight under the more stringent Part 135 rather than part 91 
weather minimums.   
In the past HEMS operations would routinely conduct the dead leg portion of a 
flight (either to the scene to pick up the patient or back to base after delivering the 
patient) under Part 91 rules. Research has since clearly demonstrated that over 50% of all 
fatal HEMS accidents occur with no patient on board (NTSB, September 24, 2009).  To 
address this problem the NTSB has recommended and much of the industry has 
embraced the requirement that all portions of a patient transport flight must be conducted 
under Part 135 minimums.  
05.02.00 ALL “PATIENT TRANSPORT FLIGHTS”* must be 
conducted under FAA Part 135 regulations for weather minimums 
and flight crew duty time limitations. *Patient transport flight is 
defined as any flight segment conducted by rotor or fixed wing 
equipment that is necessary for transporting patients and the 
medical teams required to care for such patients. Flight segments 
included in this definition are: flights for refueling and 
repositioning for a specific patient transport (including organ donor 
transports); picking up and returning medical teams to an assigned 
base; the actual flight segment involving patient movement; and 
any time medical teams are on board (CAMTS, 2011). 
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Despite these efforts, aeromedical crews continue to accept flights in conditions 
which invite disaster.  The realization that there are very real financial consequences for 
refusing to accept a flight may encourage faulty aeronautical decision making.    
The Profit Motive 
Economic Landscape. 
There are very real financial consequences of turning down a flight.  In the United 
States, the vast majority of HEMS operations are private rather than public entities.  Even 
those that are titularly “not for profit” must produce a surplus in order to stay in business.   
The number of HEMS operations has skyrocketed in the last twenty years.  In 
1991 there were approximately 225 helicopters involved in HEMS operations (Wright, 
2004).  Today, there are 840 medical service helicopters in operation (FAA, June 8, 
2010), accounting for over 400,000 patient transports every year (Flight Safety 
Foundation, 2009).  Since 2000 it is estimated that the number of HEMS aircraft 
operating in the United States has increased by 50 percent (Ludwig, 2008). 
There are many reasons for this explosive growth, not the least of which is an 
increase in demand brought about by the closure and downsizing of small, rural 
healthcare facilities (Ludwig, 2008).  Another and perhaps more overarching reason for 
the increase in air medical assets is an increase in reimbursement.  In 2000, the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) – the government agency that determines 
Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement rates – changed the formula in use for 
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determining adequate compensation for air medical services; resulting in more generous 
reimbursements (National Association of State EMS Officials, 2009).   
A dramatic side effect of this change has been an altering of the HEMS corporate 
landscape.  Prior to 2000, the growth in the HEMS industry had been fairly slow and 
predictable, with the majority of services either not for profit or government owned.  
Following 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in private, for—profit companies 
entering the market.  Because many of these companies failed, or were financially weak, 
there has also been an explosion of mergers and acquisitions (National Association of 
State EMS Officials, 2009). 
One byproduct of this prodigious growth has been the virtual saturation of HEMS 
resources in certain areas of the country.  Arizona is a prime example.  The Phoenix 
metropolitan area encompasses over 3200 square miles and is comprised of Maricopa and 
Pinal counties.  It has a population of approximately 4.2 million people (US Census 
Bureau, 2010).   
Serving this area are four adult and one pediatric American College of Surgeons 
Level 1 Trauma Centers (the highest level designation for trauma services) and no fewer 
than 9 rotor wing and 2 fixed wing Emergency Medical aircraft.  Because of the 
disbursement of the trauma centers, there is no area of the metropolitan area that is farther 
than one to one and a half hours by ground from state of the art trauma care.  In 
comparison, there are no Level 1 Trauma Centers and very few HEMS assets in all of 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, or Montana (American College of Surgeons, 
2011).  
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Southern Arizona is equally saturated. The Southeast Arizona Emergency 
Medical Services Region (SAEMS) is the state authorized agency that oversees EMS 
operations in all or part of Pima, Greenlee, Graham, Cochise, and Santa Cruz counties.  
This area, encompassing over 23,000 square miles and consisting of a population of 
approximately 1.3 million people, is served by sixteen private air ambulances and one 
public law enforcement helicopter that is authorized to conduct rescues and transport 
patients as needed.   
In addition to the above resources, state and local authorities have the option of 
requesting help from the United States Air Force Para-Rescue detachment (Air Force 
personnel who are trained as paramedics and whose primary job is the rescue of downed 
airmen behind enemy lines) at Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona as well 
as the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Patrol air assets, 
including BORSTAR agents who are paramedics.  There are more helicopters in central 
and southern Arizona than in all of Canada – where twenty helicopters serve 21 million 
people in four provinces (NTSB, 2009). 
All of the HEMS assets within Arizona, with the exception of one hospital based 
program in Flagstaff, Arizona, are community based services.  These bases are private 
Part 135 operators, and as such they are free to “base” wherever the organization sees a 
need.  In the Phoenix metropolitan area, the majority of HEMS assets are based in the 
outlying suburbs, with few resources directly downtown.  Population density and the 
close proximity of trauma services negate the need for air transportation assets in the core 
of the city. 
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In southeastern Arizona, thirteen of the sixteen helicopters are based in small, 
rural communities outside of the Tucson metropolitan area (the main population center, 
accounting for approximately half of the overall population in the region).  
The competition for patients among HEMS providers in Arizona is fierce.  With 
such a large number of air assets competing for flights, one or two calls per week can 
mean the difference between success and failure for any single base.   
Operational Expenses. 
HEMS bases are astronomically expensive to equip and maintain.  Most of the 
HEMS providers in Arizona use either the Eurocopter A-Star 350 B3 or Bell 407.  Both 
of these aircraft are versatile and cost effective platforms.  However, they are not cheap: 
both aircraft average between $1.5 million to $3 million before any of the modifications 
necessary to produce a functioning HEMS aircraft.  On average, each HEMS aircraft 
costs roughly $2000 per hour to operate, excluding personnel and equipment costs 
associated with the mission (Wilder, 2012). 
The specialized equipment needed to operate in the aeromedical environment is 
also expensive.  The average cost for cardiac monitoring equipment alone is over $40,000 
per aircraft.   All told, each HEMS asset has in excess of $100,000 worth of specialized 
equipment and medication on board; much more than the average ground based 
Advanced Life Support ambulance (Wilder, 2011).   
Another factor influencing the cost of HEMS services is the quality and training 
of the air medical crew members.  CAMTS (2011) requires that each air medical crew 
member have a minimum of three to five years critical care nursing or relevant field 
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experience prior to hire.  Initial flight training lasts between six weeks and three months 
for most services.  This is simply an average.  Air Life in Denver, Colorado can spend up 
to six months training new crew members before they are released to function 
independently (Abel, 2011). 
After training, each air medical crew member is required to maintain a myriad of 
advanced certifications as well as an extensive amount of yearly continuing education 
requirements (CAMTS, 2011).  The average air medical crewmember must maintain, at a 
minimum: Certified Flight Registered Nurse (CFRN) or Certified Flight Paramedic (CF-
P); Basic Life Support (CPR); Advanced Cardiac Life Support (ACLS); Pediatric 
Advanced Life Support (PALS); Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP); and a nationally 
recognized trauma certification (Basic Trauma Life Support, International Trauma Life 
Support, Transport Nurse Advanced Trauma Course).  On top of these mandatory 
certifications, each air medical crew member averages an additional forty hours of 
clinical time per year to maintain their skills in such specialty areas as high risk obstetrics 
and advanced airway techniques and invasive procedures (chest thoracostomy, surgical 
cricothyrotomy, and central line placement).  These requirements represent a significant 
investment in time and treasure for both the individual provider and the HEMS operator. 
Things are no different on the aviation side of the house.  HEMS pilots are 
required to have a minimum of 2000 hours in order to be considered for employment.  
PHI Air Medical (2011) has published the following minimum qualifications for their 
HEMS pilots: 2000 hours total time, 1500 helicopter, 1000 helicopter PIC and 500 hours 
turbine engine helicopter time, and 100 hours night unaided flight time.  In addition to the 
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air medical pilot and crew, each HEMS base also has a dedicated mechanic who 
maintains the aircraft at a level at or above Part 135 minimums (Wilder, 2011). 
Because of the large investment necessary to equip and maintain a successful 
HEMS operation, the cost of the service is equally large.  In Arizona EMS providers are 
required to publish their rates for the consumer.  In 2011, the average cost of a HEMS 
transport was $13,250 before mileage (AZ Department of Health Services, 2011).  This is 
in stark contrast to the amount Medicare pays HEMS operators:  
The Medicare ambulance reimbursement fee structure differs between 
rural and urban services. Rural providers have a higher 
reimbursement fee structure because rural HEMS operators have less 
volume and longer distances to fly. The fixed rate for an urban area is 
$3,308 per trip plus $21.53 per mile. In rural areas, Medicare pays 50 
percent more ($4,962 per trip plus $32.30 per mile)  (NTSB, 2009, p. 
9). 
The extremely high operational costs coupled with uncertain reimbursements 
make HEMS operations financially tenuous at best.   
Financial Performance and Employee Morale 
For much of the twentieth century, business literature tended to describe the 
causal relationship between employee morale/job satisfaction and organizational 
performance as flowing from the employee to the organization.  In this model the lines of 
causation are linear and unidirectional: the more satisfied the employee is, the more 
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productive he or she becomes, and as a result, the more successful the organization is 
overall (Denison, 1990; March & Sutton, 1997).   
Recent studies have begun to question this linear, unidirectional relationship.  
Schneider, et.al., (2003) argue that, “models that draw the causal arrows from employee 
attitudes to performance at the organizational level of analysis are at best too simplistic 
and at worst wrong” (p. 846).  Rather, they describe a more reciprocal relationship; one 
where employee satisfaction flows in part from the financial success of the organization.   
Under this model, financially successful organizations are more appealing to 
current and prospective employees.  Not only are these organizations able to pay more 
and provide better benefits, but there is less concern over future economic security.  This 
in turn results in lower employee turnover and a higher quality of applicant (Schneider, 
et.al., 2003).   
The social contract between employer and employee changed dramatically 
following World War II.  No longer is it customary for an employee to stay with one 
company throughout their working career.  Karnes (2009) quotes Mark Mattox, Human 
Resource Manager for Dr. Pepper Snapple Group to make this argument: “Thirty to forty 
years ago there was an unwritten natural order of progression in society which 
businesses, government and the populous followed.  It held that you went to school, got a 
job, married your sweetheart, had children, raised your kids, sent them to college, and 
retired after fifty years with one company” (p. 191).   
That is no longer the case.  Rather, “In this fast-paced, dog-eat-dog world, the 
thought of having commitment between employers and employees seems pretty far-
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fetched” (Karnes, 2009, p. 191).  Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor in the Clinton 
administration, describes just how insecure many modern employees have become:  
“Companies no longer offer job security.  Now they routinely down-size their 
workforces, or resort to what might be called ‘down-waging’ and ‘down-benefitting’ 
(Reich, 2002, p.14) in order to remain competitive.  This has had a profoundly 
destabilizing effect on the workforce.  Where once employee loyalty was simply assumed 
and taken for granted, there is now a willingness among employees to “leave at the first 
sign of trouble” (Karnes, 2009, p. 192).  Employee insecurity can be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy and have a dramatic effect on an organization’s bottom line: employees who 
fear for their financial future are constantly on the lookout for their next position.  This in 
turn leads to increased employee turnover and dramatically higher human resource costs 
(Phillips, 1996).  
Anecdotal evidence regarding the effect of financial solvency on aeronautical 
decision making can be seen in this conversation regarding maintenance practices at one 
HEMS base.  The base in question had come under increased scrutiny because of 
excessive operating cost.  Despite being 105% over budget in terms of flight volume, the 
base was severely in the red overall. 
An in-depth financial analysis revealed that over $150,000 of that deficit was due 
to unplanned major maintenance, including replacement of a tail rotor and rotor head on 
aircraft assigned to the base.  The remainder of the short fall was due to less than 
projected reimbursement and the cost of transitioning the base from an A Star 350 to a 
Bell 407. 
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Information regarding the bases finances was shared with the staff during a 
specially called meeting by management, including reasons for the deficit and plans to 
bring the base back to solvency.  During these discussions a pilot stated quite honestly, “I 
won’t do this, but you telling me this makes me feel like next time I see something minor, 
I don’t want to report it” (Confidential Correspondence, 2011). 
This hesitancy to report minor mechanical concerns could be catastrophic to the 
safety of everyone involved.  As discussed above, the vast majority of HEMS accidents 
are human factors related.  Mechanical problems are an extremely rare event.  This will 
only continue to be the case as long as problems are identified, reported, and addressed. 
The Kelly Effect 
Another factor which may affect the “go/no go” decision among HEMS crews is 
what I refer to as the Kelly effect.  Also known by the more pejorative nickname “hero 
syndrome,” this tag refers to the internal compulsion to accept a flight in marginal 
conditions or at the ragged edges of the flight envelope because of the belief that lives are 
at stake. 
Major Charles L. Kelly is known as the “Father of Dust Off” (Zabecki, 2009).  
His exploits were larger than life, and set a standard that effects HEMS operations to this 
day.  Medical evacuation missions in Vietnam were called “dust off” missions.  The 
name comes from a quirk of fate.  When the first air ambulance unit arrived in Vietnam 
(57
th
 Medical Detachment – Air Ambulance), they simply went by the moniker “Army,” 
and did not have a standard, assigned radio frequency.  The new commander, Major 
Spencer, found this situation intolerable and set about fixing it.  He went to the Navy 
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Support Activity in Saigon, who was responsible for assigning all call signs in South 
Vietnam.  After being handed a dictionary of unused call words, he stumbled across “dust 
off.”  Given that during the dry season the unit’s landing zones were often parched, and 
the rotor wash made dust and debris fly everywhere, Major Spencer thought the name 
apropos (Dorland & Nanney, 1982).   
 The third commander of the 57
th 
Medical Detachment – Air Ambulance, Major 
Charles L. Kelly, is credited with creating the “Dust Off” mystique.  A tough, no 
nonsense commander, he did not suffer fools and did not let obstacles get in his way 
while completing a mission.  As American involvement in Vietnam increased, so did the 
operational tempo.  To keep up with demand, and avoid being grounded, Major Kelly and 
his pilots intentionally falsified their flight logs; omitting hours flown to stay under 
regulatory requirements (Dorland & Nanney, 1982).   
Major Kelly and his pilots also gained the reputation of going where other 
aircrews refused in order to pick up injured soldiers and civilians.  One 1 July 1964 
Major Kelly responded to a call by a South Vietnamese Army unit requesting evacuation 
of their American advisor who had been injured by shrapnel and several Vietnamese 
soldiers.  As Major Kelly approached the area, the ground forces tried to wave him off 
because of enemy activity in the area.  In what has become the iconic image of the Dust 
Off pilot in Vietnam, Major Kelly is reported to have responded, “when I have your 
wounded,” and continued in towards the landing zone (LZ).  As the helicopter got closer 
to the LZ, small arms fire intensified, and a round struck Major Kelly in the chest, killing 
him almost instantly.  Major Kelly was posthumously awarded him the Distinguished 
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Service Cross for his gallantry and valor (Dorland & Nanney, 1982; Dust Off 
Association, 1997). 
Major Kelly’s belief that the mission must be completed regardless of the rules, or 
the cost, has been a two edged sword for civilian HEMS.  The Dust Off mystique is still 
pervasive, despite organizational efforts to diminish its influence. 
Mission Orientation and Professional Motivation 
There are several reasons for this mission oriented mindset, not the least of which 
is the belief that what HEMS does matters.  In their work on effective government 
organizations, Rainey and Steinbauer (1999) postulate a “Public Service Motivation” that 
is different from that found in the civilian sector.  They define this motivation as “a 
general altruistic motivation to serve the interests of a community of people, a state, a 
nation, or humankind” (p. 23).   
Building upon this work, University of North Carolina Professor Bradley Wright 
(2007) argues “that employee reward preferences coincide with the function served by 
the sector in which they are employed.  Public sector employees have repeatedly been 
found to place a lower value on financial rewards and a higher value on helping others 
(public service) than their private sector counterparts” (p. 54).   He goes on to state that 
“studies that have found similar levels of work motivation among public and private 
employees suggest that the importance employees place on contributing to the public 
service mission of their organization may provide intrinsic rewards” not usually 
associated with private sector employment (p. 54).   
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Using these definitions as a framework, it is easy to see that although 
predominantly private; HEMS professionals share many common characteristics with 
their public sector counterparts.  The high degree of “mission motivation” can be 
attributed in part to a very high degree of “mission valence,” or the belief that what one 
does is worthwhile.  Employees that believe in the organization’s mission are “motivated 
to contribute to the achievement of the mission” (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999, p. 25).  
Professor Wright describes the phenomena this way: “the extent to which an individual 
accepts a performance goal and is determined to reach it, even if confronted with 
setbacks or obstacles” (Wright, 2007, p. 55).   
Other researchers dismiss the public/private sector divide and instead argue that 
the intrinsic motivators associated with public service workers can just as easily be found 
in the private sector (Kjeldsen, 2010).  In a paper delivered before the Fourteenth Annual 
Conference of the International Research Society for Public Management, Professor 
Kjeldsen of Aarhus University in Denmark argues that a commitment to the public 
interest, self-sacrifice, and compassion are more a function of occupation than sector.   
In her study Professor Kjeldsen (2010) found that nurses who were employed by 
private agencies had motivations similar to those nurses employed by the National Health 
Service.  Motivations emanated “from their educational background, and they feel an 
obligation to continuously upgrade their skills in this regard. Two of the nurses mention 
that duty to serve the public interest is specified in their authorization as nurses. This 
clearly points to educational and professional socialization as important antecedents for 
determining occupational differences in Public Service Motivation” (p. 11). 
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This occupational orientation is especially relevant to HEMS.  Multiple studies of 
pilot personality traits reveal similar characteristics:  “The person who wishes to be an 
aviator, the folklore tells us, must possess supernormal levels of courage, audacity, self-
discipline, aggressiveness, dominance, self-reliance, and above all self-confidence” 
(Retzlaff & Giberini, 1987, pp. 383).  As stereotypical as this description sounds, there is 
evidence of its veracity.   
Assessments of military pilots using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI) found military pilots to be more “social, aggressive, self-confident, 
and intellectually-striving than normal while displaying less hypochondriasis, anxiety, 
and schizoid and antisocial tendencies” (Retzlaff & Gibertini, 1987, pp. 384-385).   
Other less well known studies of personality traits have found military pilots to be 
more achievement oriented, dominant, dependable, practical, and pragmatic (Retzlaff &  
Gibertini, 1987).  While pilots are not a homogenous group, most successful aviators 
have proven to be intelligent, emotionally mature and stable, action oriented and 
reasonably adaptable (Ganesh & Joseph, 2005).   
Likewise there is a well-defined “rescue personality” (Mitchell & Bray, 1990).   
People that choose Emergency Services as a profession “have a high need for stimulation, 
are risk takers, are highly dedicated, and have a need to help others” (Salters-Pedneault, 
Ruef, & Orr, 2010, p. 210).   
These characteristics are close enough to those displayed by successful aviators to 
be synergistic.  Each member of the aeromedical flight crew has a predisposition to 
completing the mission.  Rather than tempering the willingness of another crewmember 
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to take an unacceptable risk, the personality make up of HEMS crews may in fact “feed 
into” each other’s need to complete the mission, with the potential for disastrous results.   
Objective Evidence of the Kelly Effect in HEMS 
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) offers proof of just how pervasive the Kelly effect is.  The 
following examples from the ASRS database are instructive (Connell & Patten, 1993): 
‘We were on an air ambulance flight...picked up a team of organ 
removal surgeons in XYZ...and flew them to ABC to remove the 
heart from a donor. The weather was clear and forecast to remain 
so. We understood... [that] the heart has a very short lifetime 
between removal from the donor and installation in the recipient, 
so when the recovery team arrived back at the ABC airport it 
would be necessary to expedite as much as possible...The 
F/O...[and I] readied the aircraft for the return leg and then went 
into the FBO to wait...Shortly before the medical team's departure 
from the airport...the fog began to roll into the area. Upon [their] 
arrival, the visibility was down to 4000 RVR... [but] our operations 
specifications call for minimum 5000 RVR for departure. I felt it 
was necessary to depart below minimums based on our medical 
emergency...I felt the decision to depart below minimums was the 
only one available to me under the circumstances. If we had waited 
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for improved visibility, the heart would have been ruined, and the 
receiving patient may have died’ (ACN 221023)  
 
‘...High risk delivery, mother in distress. I allowed patient's 
condition to influence my decisions. Got above layer, had to 
descend IFR in a non-certified but well-equipped aircraft’ (ACN 
58837) 
 
‘...Quick EMS helicopter responses, numerous interruptions during 
start-up, added pressure of a dying person, causing pilot to make 
emotional decisions instead of safe ones and the pilot allowing this 
to happen. Most likely a pilot would not fly unless under excessive 
pressure to do so-- not by anyone (else), but self-imposed’ (ACN 
118240)  
 
These examples clearly show the self-imposed internal pressure faced by many 
HEMS pilots and air medical crewmembers.  I do not argue that the Kelly effect is 
inherently bad; rather I believe it is an intrinsic part of what motivates aviation and 
medical professionals to practice in this unique environment.  That said it is important to 
recognize the detrimental effect this motivation may have on the safety of flight. 
  
24 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Aeronautical Decision Making 
As discussed above, pilot decision errors are the number one cause of HEMS 
related accidents and fatalities.  Likewise, sub-optimal decision making is the primary 
cause of major accidents and fatalities in General Aviation (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; 
Madhavan & Lacson, 2006; FAA, 2008; Hunter & Stewart, 2009).  According to Goh & 
Wiegmann (2001), “fatal aviation accidents are more often associated with decision 
errors than minor accidents, which tend to be associated with procedural execution 
errors” (p. 360).   
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) describes aeronautical decision 
making as a “Systematic approach to the mental process of evaluating a given set of 
circumstances and determining the best course of action” (FAA, 1991, p. ii).  Jensen 
(1995) defines pilot judgment as “the mental process that we use in making decisions” (p. 
27).   
In the past there has been a “which came first: the chicken or the egg?” type of 
quandary in terms of aeronautical decision making.  Many pilots believe that good 
judgment “is a natural process that is attained through experience.  At the same time they 
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are generally convinced that if you don’t have enough of the former, you will not live 
long enough to gain the latter (Jensen, 1989, p. 4).  
In an effort to understand why pilots and crew members make decisions that may 
ultimately lead to disaster, researchers have offered many different insights (Jensen, 
1995; Goh & Wiegmann, 2001; Li & Harris, 2001; Madhavan & Lacson, 2006).  One of 
the most frequently cited models for decision making was developed by Jensen (1995) 
who described an eight step process.  In this model, decision making proceeds 
sequentially from: 
1. Problem Vigil:  The baseline state of awareness that the pilot or crewmember 
are in so that they can detect changes in the environment. 
2. Recognition:  The realization that changes in the environment may affect the 
safety of flight. 
3. Diagnosis:  The pilot and crew members attempt to understand the nature of 
the problem (change in the environment). 
4. Alternative Identification:  This is the problem solving stage.  Various courses 
of action are identified and considered. 
5. Risk Assessment:  The pilot and crewmembers attempt to evaluate each 
alternative identified in the previous stage according to the risks they may 
engender. 
6. Background Factor:  This is where the pilot’s and crew member’s experiences 
and prejudices are incorporated.   
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7. Decision Making:  The pilot and/or crewmembers make a decision. 
8. Action:  The decision is put into practice. 
Jensen’s model can be broken into two distinct phases:  “rational judgment” 
which encompasses the first five steps and “motivational judgment” which accounts for 
the last three tasks.  According to this model, rational judgment is the “ability to discover 
and establish the relevance of all available information relating to problems of flight, to 
diagnose these problems, to specify alternative course of action and to assess the risk 
associated with each alternative,” while motivational judgment is the ability to “choose 
and execute” a suitable course of action within the available time frame (Hunter, 2003, p. 
375). 
Attempting to capture and measure a pilot’s driving force in the decision making 
process is important because it is at this stage that “the motivational forces that keep us 
from following purely rational decisions” (Jensen, 1995, p. 46) comes into play.  While 
looking at the problem of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC), Goh and Wiegmann (2001) postulate that “pilots may 
diagnose and perceive the risks accurately, but other motivational factors bias their 
decisions … to continue with the flight even though an assessment of the situation 
suggests otherwise” (p. 361).   
In their study Goh and Wiegmann gave a group of non-instrument rated private 
pilots a predetermined scenario utilizing a flight simulator.  The subjects each flew two 
routes.  The first route was flown to allow the pilot to familiarize themselves with the 
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controls; the second route was flown to gauge their reactions to the experimental 
condition.   
Approximately 45 minutes into the second flight the subject was forced to deal 
with deteriorating weather conditions.  Subjects had a five minute window from the time 
the weather conditions fell below VFR minimums to make their decision whether or not 
to terminate the flight.  If the pilot had not made the decision to terminate the flight by 
the end of the five minute window, he or she was considered to have made the decision to 
continue with the flight and the experiment was ended (Goh & Wiegmann, 2001). 
Surprisingly 22/32 (68.75%) of the subjects chose to continue the flight despite 
the deteriorating weather conditions.  Analysis of the data, including a post flight 
questionnaire, showed that:  
Pilots who chose to continue with the flight had higher ratings of 
skill and judgment, suggesting that they had greater confidence in 
their abilities to control the aircraft than the pilots that chose to 
divert.  Furthermore, pilots who chose to continue rated themselves 
as more willing to take risks than pilots who chose to divert.  
Together these two group differences suggest that because of 
greater confidence in their own piloting abilities, the pilots who 
continued were more willing to risk flying into adverse weather 
(Goh & Wiegmann, 2001, p. 376).   
These findings are consistent with a study conducted in the United Kingdom by 
the Civil Aviation Authority “who cited the psychological factors contributing to pilot 
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errors in bad weather included ‘excessive optimism,’ a ‘reluctance to admit limited 
capability,’ and ‘lack of appreciation of real dangers’” (Madhavan & Lacson, 2006, p. 
53).   
Wichman and Ball (1983) describe this phenomenon as a confluence between 
Locus of Control (LOC) and Self Serving Bias (SSB).  According to the authors, SSB is a 
protective mechanism and “can be viewed as a tendency to make attributional responses 
which protect and maintain one’s self esteem.  This seems related to other finding 
characterizing what has now come to be called the fundamental attribution error – 
making dispositional attributions rather than situational attributions, or the tendency to 
attribute one’s own failures to external factors and one’s successes to internal factors” (p. 
507).  
The author’s rely upon Rotter’s definition to explain LOC:  
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject as following 
some action of his own but not being entirely contingent upon his 
action, then, in our culture, it is typically perceived as the result of 
luck, chance, fate …we have labeled this a belief in external 
control.  If the person perceives that the event is contingent upon 
his own behavior or his own relatively permanent characteristics, 
we have termed this a belief in internal control (Wichman & Ball, 
1983, p. 507). 
In their research Wichman and Ball administered a series of tests designed to 
measure both LOC (internal versus external) and SSB to three separate groups of pilots.  
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Their results showed that the pilots believed themselves to have a less than average 
chance of being in an accident and to have greater than average piloting skills.  “Aviators 
with more experience and exposure develop stronger self-serving biases. These people 
tend also to be more internal in locus of control. So their way of handling dangers is not 
just to make light of them, but to actively do something about reducing the dangers” 
(1983, p. 509).   
Male Pilot Personalities 
There have been no published studies that directly relate to the go-no go decision 
in HEMS.  However, as the discussion above clearly shows, there have been numerous 
attempts to describe and quantify problems associated with aeronautical decision making.   
Human Factors experts have been studying the effect of personality traits and 
attitudes on aeronautical decision making for decades.  Research on certain key attitudes 
that may predispose a pilot to making unwise or hazardous judgments is voluminous 
(Retzlaff & Gibertini, 1987; Vail, 1988; Dukes, Hulbert-Johnson, Newton, & Overstreet, 
1991; Davey & Davidson, 2000; Johnson, 2003; Ganesh & Joseph, 2005; Vermeulen & 
Mitchell, 2007). 
Personality may be defined as the “the complex of characteristics that 
distinguishes an individual or a nation or group; especially: the totality of an individual's 
behavioral and emotional characteristics b: a set of distinctive traits and characteristics” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2009).  Likewise attitudes can be viewed as “learned and relatively 
enduring perception, expressed or unexpressed, influencing a person to think or behave in 
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a fairly predictable manner toward objects, persons, or situations” (Wilkening, 1973, p. 
28).   
Retzlaff & Gibertini (1987) state that pilots are more achievement oriented, 
dominant, dependable, practical, and pragmatic.  While pilots are not a homogenous 
group, most successful aviators have proven to be intelligent, emotionally mature and 
stable, action oriented and reasonably adaptable (Ganesh & Joseph, 2005).   
A study involving 2485 military pilots and navigators found that these men scored 
higher on global measures of psychological well-being than the civilian control group.  
“Variables that were associated with psychological well-being were better overall health, 
lack of perceived time pressure, more competitive behavior and a positive attitude 
towards physical fitness” (Retzlaff & Gibertini, 1987, pp. 385).    
In a study using the ‘Occupational Personality Questionnaire,’ a test developed 
specifically for the workplace, the majority of military pilots fell into one of three groups 
or clusters.  The first group, comprising 48 percent of the pilots tested, were labeled as 
“methodical extroverts’ and had strong needs to master their environment and strong 
desire for novelty and change.”  The second group of pilots (36%) was known as 
“introverted worriers.”  These men were described as “apprehensive, emotionally 
controlled, inhibited and socially retiring.”  The third and smallest cluster of pilots, 
comprising only 16% of the total sample size was labeled “competitive individualists.”  
They were “competitive, highly independent, and decisive” (Ganesh & Joseph, 2005, pp. 
56).  
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The fact that over one third of the pilots tested (36%) displayed traits counter to 
the hyper-masculine stereotype, shows the heterogeneity among military pilots; a 
prerequisite of operational success.  “Pilots, in addition to being competitive, dominant, 
and achieving, must possess a fair degree of self-control and level headedness in order to 
function within the highly structured military environment” (Retzlaff & Gibertini, 1987, 
pp. 396). 
Female Pilot Personalities 
In their study, Ganesh and Joseph (2005), found that there were “relatively large 
differences between female pilots and non- pilot females, whereas there were small 
differences between male and female pilots” (p.57).  These results give credence to the 
suggestion that there is an “aviator personality type” (Dukes, Hulbert-Johnson, Newton, 
& Overstreet, 1991, pp. 722) that is independent of gender. 
Studies of female United States Air Force aviators found them to be “generally 
calm, emotionally resilient, extraverted, outgoing, active, high-spirited, open to new 
experiences, competitive, tough-minded, dependable, and moderately well-organized” 
(Chappelle, et.al., 2010, p. 162).  What is interesting is that the authors report a sense 
among many Air Force personnel that there is a difference in personality among the 
female pilots according to the type of airframe they command. 
It has been reported that female fighter and bomber pilots appear to 
be more aggressive, competitive, extroverted, and excitement 
seeking than female pilots assigned to other airframes. USAF 
female pilots assigned to tanker and transporter airframes with 
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large aircrews tend to be perceived as more interpersonally warm, 
gregarious, and trusting, as well as less aggressive and competitive 
… however, there are no published studies assessing personality 
differences between USAF female pilots according to the airframe 
they are assigned to fly to clarify this issue (Chappelle, et.al., 2010, 
p. 162). 
Using data from the NEO Personality Inventory – Revised (NEO PI-R), 
Chappelle, et.al. (2010) compared the scores of 512 female and 9,630 male Air Force 
pilots on active duty at the time of the study.  These scores were compared to a group of 
500 civilian non pilot females who acted as a control group.  The NEO PI-R is a 240 
question tool designed to test normal personality characteristics along five domains: 
neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness, and conscientiousness.  It has been 
administered to all Air Force pilot candidates since 1994. 
Chappelle, et.al.’s results are consistent with those of Ganesh and Joseph (2005).  
United States Air Force female aviators have more in common with their male 
counterparts than the civilian control group.  Specifically, Chappelle, et.al. (2010) found 
that: 
They [female U.S. Air Force pilots] are more interpersonally 
gregarious, assertive, outgoing, excitement-seeking, and expressive 
of positive emotions. As a group, they are more open to new 
experiences, inner feelings, and emotions and are more willing to 
consider new and perhaps unconventional ideas. However, they are 
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more inclined to be tough minded, straightforward, proud, 
competitive, achievement oriented, and self-confident. As a group, 
the test scores for female pilots also indicate that they are more 
open to inner feelings and emotions while also being more capable 
of handling stress and remaining composed in difficult and highly 
challenging situations … It should be noted the differences 
between female and male USAF pilots are not the usual male–
female sex differences one typically obtains. For example, a 
review of male–female differences from the civilian normative 
data for the NEO PI-R reveals that females tend to be more 
trusting, altruistic, modest, tender minded, self-conscious, and 
vulnerable to negative emotional states. This finding further 
exemplifies how different USAF female pilots are as a group from 
females in the general population (p. 168).  
This study, though fascinating, has several significant shortfalls.  First is the 
educational preparation of the participants.  All of the pilot participants held at least a 
four year college degree (16 years of formal education); the average education level for 
the female control group was 13.6 years.  
There is also the potential compounding variable of military service.  While the 
presence of a “pilot personality” is well established, there is also the shared mores and 
folkways found among those who choose the military as a career (Kelty, Kleykamp, & 
Segal, 2010).  It would be beneficial to see a comparison similar to the one conducted 
above, but using female, non-pilot, military officers as the control group.  This 
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framework would eliminate the concerns aroused by the different educational levels 
between groups, as well as neutralize any effects from shared military ethos.  
Five Hazardous Attitudes 
In Advisory Circular AC-60-22 “Aeronautical Decision Making,” (1991), the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) outlines what it considers to be the five most 
dangerous attitudes and offers guidance to pilots on how to mitigate the negative effects 
of these traits.  Research conducted by Wetmore and Lu (2006) concluded that 
“hazardous attitudes have a measurable, negative effect on a pilot’s ADM [Aeronautical 
Decision Making] and CRM [Cockpit Resource Management] skills that can be 
summarized as follows: (a) more willing to accept high risk flights; (b) more prone to 
making bad decisions; (c) more likely to commit pilot errors; and (d) less likely to use all 
of the available cockpit resources” (p. 165). 
Five hazardous attitudes were initially identified by a team from Embry-Riddle 
Aeronautical University working under contract with the FAA to develop training 
material aimed at lessening the effect of poor pilot decision making (Murray, 1999; 
Lester & Bombaci, 1984).  AC- 60-22 describes these five attitudes as:  
1. Antiauthority:  Do not tell me what to do 
2. Impulsivity: Do something - anything 
3. Invulnerability: It will not happen to me 
4. Macho: I can do it 
5. Resignation: What is the use? 
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In a follow on study, Lester and Bombaci (1984) reported, “The finding that 
almost half of the subjects displayed a predominantly invulnerable hazardous thought 
pattern suggests that this may be a major mediator of irrational pilot judgment” (p. 570).  
In their conclusion they argue that people with a “resigned” attitude rarely complete pilot 
training and are thus less of a danger than those with anti-authoritarian, invulnerable, and 
impulsive personality traits (Lester & Bombaci, 1984).   
Steven R. Murray (1999) has gone so far as to suggest that a sixth hazardous 
attitude be added to the FAA’s original five.  He argues the need to save “face” can have 
a profound effect on a pilot’s aeronautical decision making.  According to Murray, “face” 
is a universal phenomenon and deals with the individual’s assessment of how others view 
him/her.  “The universality of face and the negative consequences of loss of face are well 
known and acknowledged.  Although pilots have been shown to have clearly different 
personality profiles than the population at large, there is no evidence to suggest that pilots 
are any less likely to … suffer the negative consequences of loss of face” (p. 405).  He 
goes on to say that “the aviation community is a fraternity, or group, in which shame and 
humiliation are visited upon the pilot who violates its high standards … which leads to 
risk taking behavior” (p. 406). 
The idea of face is closely aligned with that of the macho, invulnerable, and 
antiauthoritarian personality traits previously identified by the FAA.  As mentioned 
above, in their study of pilot personalities, Ganesh & Joseph (2005) found sizable 
differences between female pilots and their civilian counterparts, but a much smaller 
difference between male and female pilots, giving credence to the assertion that the 
stereotypical “pilot personality” is independent of gender. 
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Invulnerable Hazardous Attitude   
Invulnerability has been cited as a causal factor in drivers as well.  Rather than a 
personality trait per se, Jonah (1986) found that the sense of invulnerability had as much 
to do with risk perception and tolerance as motivation.  Risk perception is the recognition 
of the risk inherent in any given activity.  Risk tolerance is the amount of risk an 
individual is willing to accept in the pursuit of a goal.  Both may independently adversely 
affect aeronautical decision making (Hunter, 2002).   
Risk perception is subjective.  It is mediated by both the situation and the viewer.  
“Underestimation of the external situation and overestimation of personal capacity leads 
to a misperception of the risk and is frequently seen as a factor in aircraft accidents” 
(Hunter, 2002, p. 3).  Likewise, risk tolerance is also mediated by personal experience.  It 
is influenced to a large extent by the value the person assigns to a particular activity.  
“For example, in one survey, pilots indicated that they would take more risks in order to 
return home for the Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays than they would for flying 
medicine to a remote village” (Hunter, 2002, p. 3). 
To study the interaction between risk assessment and risk tolerance, Hunter 
(2002) administered a series of scenarios to a self-selected group of pilots.  Each scenario 
was designed to test the pilot’s ability to identify risks as well as his/her tolerance for 
those dangers.  “In real aviation settings, in order to get where one wants to go, it is not 
possible to sit forever on the ground (taking zero risk) or to fly headlong through all 
obstacles on the most direct route (ignoring all risks).  Rather, it is necessary to consider 
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the risks in the context of the desired outcome, and to expose oneself to the minimum risk 
necessary to accomplish the goal” (p. 6). 
Hunter found that the more experience the pilot had, the less likely it is they 
would view a particular situation as risky.  This finding suggests that to some extent, 
experience breeds a sense of invulnerability.  This is consistent with the “Zero Risk 
Theory” which holds that “as self-confidence increases (largely as a function of increased 
experience in the situation), perceived risk diminishes to the point of zero perceived risk” 
(Hunter, 2002, p. 1).   
Hunter’s findings are also consistent with the relationship between risk perception 
and tolerance described by Jonah (1986).  “Pilots with a low perception of risk tended to 
be involved in more hazardous events” (p. 20).  He goes on to insist that, from a 
regulatory point of view, “it is far better to have a problem caused by pilot skill 
deficiencies than to have a problem caused by pilot personality traits, because the former 
are far easier to change than the latter” (p. 21). 
Macho Hazardous Attitude   
In addition to a mistaken sense of invulnerability, pilots, regardless of gender, can 
fall victim to an illogical and unsupportable belief in their ability to complete a task – the 
macho hazardous attitude.  The work on hyper-masculinity and machismo is extensive 
(Tomkins, 1987; Mosher & Tomkins, 1988; Mosher, 1991; Krahe & Fenske, 2002).  
What is unique in this discussion is its application across traditional gender lines. 
Mosher and Sirkin (1984) define a “macho personality” as one that refers to an 
exaggerated endorsement of the hyper-masculine stereotype and involves three distinct 
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elements: calloused sexual attitudes toward women, the perception of violence as being 
manly, and the view that danger is exciting.  They found these traits to have a significant 
positive correlation with aggression and impulsivity and a negative relationship to 
understanding and harm avoidance. 
Krahe and Fenske (2002) argue that these traits serve a purpose.  They believe the 
predisposition to violence and risk taking is a throwback to the “intense reproductive 
competition among ancestral men.”  Young men engage in violent and risky behaviors in 
order to establish “a reputation of prowess and strength that makes them attractive mating 
partners to women and fends off potential male rivals” (p. 22). 
This ‘man as Neanderthal’ view is exemplified in the classic macho view of 
women.  “The view of masculinity as heroic is joined with a conception of women as 
dominion and as sexual object who exist as reward for the conquering hero … calloused 
sex attitudes embody some men’s attitudes that sexual intercourse with women 
establishes masculine power and female submission, and is to be achieved without 
empathic concern for the female‘s subjective experience” (Mosher & Sirkin, 1984, p. 
151, 152). 
Likewise, the propensity to violence and the belief that danger is exciting can be 
seen as “a manly display of masculine power over the dangerous environment … any 
situation that challenges or threatens masculine identity activates this structure, thereby 
motivating and organizing the personality for participation in hyper masculine behaviors 
such as dangerous risk taking, exploitive sex, or violence” (Mosher & Sirkin, 1984, p. 
152).   
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Mosher and Tompkins (1988) described these innate, almost subconscious 
responses to external stimuli (threats) as scripts.  “The macho man creates, interprets, and 
responds to scenes that threaten, challenge, or afford opportunities to enact his role as a 
macho man according to the set of rules in the macho script … the macho is living a life 
in accordance with his macho script. To enact the macho script is to live macho scenes, is 
to celebrate the ideology of machismo” (p. 62).  This scripting is not just individual, it is 
cultural.   
The cultural descendent of the nomadic warrior is the macho man. 
The ideology of machismo is a warrior’s ideology.  The macho 
warrior holds dominion over all he has conquered – he is master 
and patriarch.  Slaves, wives, and children are his property, owing 
him respect and fealty.  To maintain that dominion, the macho man 
must be prepared to risk all by acts of great daring, to compel 
enemy men to submit through violence, and to dominate female 
adversaries through callous sex … the ideological script of the 
macho man is socially inherited within a macho culture by virtue 
of being male” (Mosher & Tompkins, 1988, p. 64). 
The above discussion of the macho personality is glaringly misogynistic. Its 
emphasis on the subjugation and exploitation of women is uncomfortable to read, yet 
these views remain largely entrenched in western society.  It is not an accident that the 
prototypical pilot personality contains many of the macho personality traits detailed 
above.   
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As with most things, it is a matter of degree.  Combat aviators are by definition 
aggressive (Paullin, Katz, Bruskiewicz, Houston, & Damos, 2006; Chappelle, Novy, 
Sowin, & Thompson, 2010), yet it is this same aggression that may be a liability in terms 
of safety and appropriate aeronautical decision making.   
What is left unanswered by the above studies is how female aviators fit into this 
decidedly androcentric mold.  Given Ganesh and Joseph (2005) and Chappelle et.al’s  
(2010) findings that female aviators have more in common with their male counterparts 
than with the female control group, it is clear that the “pilot personality” is a socialized 
phenomenon rather than an inbred predisposition.  This is a rich area for further research. 
Anti-Authoritarian Hazardous Attitude   
The anti-authoritarian hazardous attitude is very similar to, and often overlaps 
with, the invulnerable and macho hazardous attitudes.  According to Advisory Circular 
60-22, “This attitude is found in people who do not like anyone telling them what to do. 
In a sense they are saying no one can tell me what to do. They may be resentful of having 
someone tell them what to do or may regard rules, regulations and procedures as silly or 
unnecessary” (p. 11).   
Aviation is one of the most heavily regulated industries in the United States.  
From aircraft and airman certification, operational checklists, maintenance practices, 
airport operations, airspace issues, and air traffic control; almost every aspect of flying is 
governed by one or more regulatory interventions.  “All modern societies manage their 
relationship with technology through expert mediators, who are usually state regulatory 
bodies such as the FAA. These regulators have become a twenty-first century clergy, 
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standing between the public and the esoteric knowledge with which they must contend” 
(Downer, 2010, p. 84). 
Callous disregard for “the rules of the road” in the unforgiving environment of 
aviation is lethal.  For this reason the FAA and other regulatory agencies are given the 
power to not only devise regulations, but punish transgressors.   
Although our society has undeniably considered aviation safety 
regulation important, there are always those few who would rather 
see governmental insouciance concerning matters of safety … the 
[FAA] Administrator has been given a statutory mandate to 
suspend, modify or revoke certificates or to impose civil penalties 
for the violation of regulations.  In the enforcement of these 
regulations the FAA institutes approximately 5000 proceedings a 
year for infractions by pilots, mechanics, air carriers, air taxis and 
others who hold various types of certificates issued by the FAA 
(Pangia, 1981, p. 574). 
Weitman (1962) conducted a study comparing pro-authoritarian, anti-
authoritarian, and non-authoritarian personality types.  His results, though dated, are 
nonetheless instructive.  His study showed that of the three personality types, pro-
authoritarians and anti-authoritarians are actually very similar; both having an abnormal 
fixation with authority.  The difference was solely that of emphasis: the pro-authoritarian 
personality usually submitted to authority while the anti-authoritarian rebelled.  By 
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contrast the non-authoritarian had a much more balanced outlook towards authority, 
displaying neither a propensity to submit or protest.   
 Interestingly, there are more studies dealing with pro-authoritarian personalities 
than anti-authoritarian traits.  While this is curious, if these studies are valid, the converse 
of the conclusions should be largely correct.   
In a review of the literature, Peterson and Zurbriggen (2010) found “those scoring 
high on authoritarianism [pro-authoritarians] (1) adhere strongly to conventional moral 
values, (2) are submissive to established authorities, and (3) are willing to aggress against 
others if they are perceived as unconventional or threatening” (p. 1802).  They are hostile 
to challenges to the status quo.   Therefore, pilots who score high on tests of 
authoritarianism should be less likely to view rules, regulations, and standard operating 
procedures as recommendations or optional.   This assumption is supported by Retzlaff 
and Gibertini (1987) who found that “while they [military aviators] are high on 
dominance and achievement, pilots are relatively low on autonomy … they function as 
part of a team and are expected to subordinate their own desires to the task at hand i.e., 
the mission” (p. 396). 
Additionally, those individuals who score high in authoritarian traits “live in a 
rigidly gendered world, one in which gender roles are narrowly defined and firmly 
enforced, attractiveness centers around traditional conceptions of masculinity and 
femininity, conventional sexual mores are prescribed, and traditional life paths (e.g., 
concerning education and career) are embraced” (Peterson & Zurbriggen, 2010, p. 1820).  
As such, feminist ideology is rejected. 
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This world view has profound implications for female aviators.  By definition, for 
a woman to succeed in the highly androcentric world of aviation, especially military 
aviation, she must possess some degree of antiauthoritarianism.  This belief is supported 
by Chappelle et.al’s findings regarding female United States Air Force aviators (2010).  
In their research they found female Air Force pilots to be “more interpersonally 
gregarious, assertive, outgoing, excitement-seeking, and expressive of positive emotions. 
As a group, they are more open to new experiences, inner feelings, and emotions and are 
more willing to consider new and perhaps unconventional ideas” than the civilian female 
control group (p. 168).   
According to Hanrahan and Antony (2005), “Feminism is, at least partly, an 
antiauthoritarian movement: it is and has been historically a movement that calls into 
question received views, that challenges the legitimacy of existing hierarchies, and that 
unmasks many traditional “authorities” as arbitrary and ungrounded” (p. 60).  Its very 
existence is an affront to the conservative, pro-authoritarian view expressed above. 
As with the invulnerable and macho hazardous attitudes, antiauthoritarianism’s 
danger is dependent upon motivation and degree.  Tests of personality show most pilots 
to be team players.  Research also shows they possess a large degree of independence and 
an increased capacity for critical thinking.  Because of this they are less likely to blindly 
accept authoritative pronouncements without first being given the underlying rationale.  
These traits transcend gender.  In fact, as discussed above, some degree of 
antiauthoritarianism is required of females wishing to join this male dominated, 
traditionally masculine profession. 
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Systemic Influences on Aeronautical Decision Making 
The history of aviation is the history of failure.  It is the story of catastrophic 
accidents and tragic losses (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000).  In 1853 Louis Charles Letur 
built a parachute glider: the first pilot-controlled, heavier than air machine.  He made 
several successful flights before suffering a fatal crash in London in 1854 (Spartacus 
Educational, 2000).  
Following their first successful powered flight on December 17, 1903 (Crouch, 
2010), the Wright brothers gave aviation its first passenger fatality on September 17, 
1908.   The fatality was Army Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge, a U.S. Military Academy 
graduate and the “Army’s foremost expert in aeronautics … [who had] written several 
papers on the future military use of the airplane” (Regan, 1999, p. 15). 
The early days of aviation are synonymous with high profile crashes.  Harriet 
Quimby, the first woman to fly the English Channel, was killed during the 1912 Harvard 
– Boston Aviation Meet.  Her French Bleriot monoplane went out of control during an 
exhibition flight and she was thrown from the aircraft; falling to her death (Gwynn- 
Jones, 1984).  Similarly tragic was the death of Bessie Coleman, the first female African 
American pilot in 1926.  Like Quimby, Coleman was thrown to her death when her plane 
became uncontrollable in flight (Creasman, 1997). 
Aviation has always been an international affair, with countries placing a great 
deal of national pride in their aviators.  This attention could have disastrous results.  
Mexican Army Captain Emilio Carranza, known as the “Mexican Lindbergh,” died in 
1928 after flying into a thunderstorm while returning from a goodwill flight to 
45 
 
Washington, D.C.  Prior to take off Captain Carranza had received several telegrams 
inquiring about his progress and encouraging him to keep to the prearranged schedule 
(Gilliam, 2005).   
The 1930s also saw no shortage of high profile, celebrity aviation fatalities.  In 
1931Knute Rockne, famed Notre Dame Football coach, was killed in a crash attributed to 
bad weather while on a flight to California (Time, 1931).  Will Rogers died in 1935 in a 
crash near Point Barrow Alaska with longtime friend and pilot Wiley Post (Columbia 
Electronic Encyclopedia, 2011).  Perhaps the most famous aviation death during this time 
was Amelia Earhart in 1937.  As one author describes her: 
Perhaps the best-known female pilot, Amelia Earhart (1897-1937) 
gained international attention for her aerial feats. In 1928, she 
became the first woman to cross the Atlantic by airplane. (Though 
she had her license, Earhart did not pilot the aircraft.) In 1932, she 
piloted a solo transatlantic flight. Earhart wrote best-selling books 
and popular columns about her experiences, endorsed commercial 
products, and lectured in the aviation department at Purdue 
University in 1935 (Bix, 2010, p. 40).  
She died in 1937 while attempting to circumnavigate the globe.  Her remains have 
never been found.   
As these examples show, the early years of aviation were synonymous with 
superhuman daring, tragedy, and death.  “In the early years of aviation, it could 
reasonably be said that, more often than not, the aircraft killed the pilot.  That is, the 
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aircraft were intrinsically unforgiving and, relative to their modern counterparts, 
mechanically unsafe.  However, the modern era of aviation has witnessed a reversal of 
sorts.  It now appears to some that the aircrew themselves are more deadly than the 
aircraft they fly” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 1).   
It is with this dramatic change that we will deal with here.  For much of the 
twentieth century, accident investigators focused on the human portion of the equation, 
looking for the specific behavior or attitude that contributed to the crash.  This made 
sense since studies have shown that between 70% and 80% of “aviation accidents can be 
attributed, at least in part, to human error” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 1).   
That said, simply writing off these crashes to pilot error is overly simplistic and 
dangerous (Reason, 1990; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001).  
“The theoretical arguments have little by little been supplemented by a growing 
realization that the process of searching for ‘human error’, and indeed the searching for 
any kind of root cause, is misguided since it corresponds to an oversimplified conception 
of how events occur” (Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001, p. 2).  Rather, “aviation accidents 
are the end result of a number of causes, only the last of which are the unsafe acts of the 
aircrew” (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000, p. 1). 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model  
A comprehensive model of the structural and human factors that lead to aviation 
accidents continues to elude researchers (Senders & Moray, 1991; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2000).  One of the most common models cited in the literature is James 
Reason’s “Swiss Cheese” model of human error (2008).  According to Reason, “frontline 
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personnel are not so much the instigators of a bad event, rather they are the inheritors of 
latent conditions (or resident pathogens) that may have been accumulating for a long time 
previously” (p. 93).   
 
Figure 1: Reason's Swiss Cheese Model 
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model is not one model, but an evolution.  Beginning in 
the 1980s, Professor Reason began exploring his thoughts on a systems approach to 
accident investigation.  Prior to that time, most models concentrated on a chain of events 
that resulted in an error, “missing the essence of organizational accidents.” Over time 
these models evolved from “the simple minded … to views that more truly reflect the 
complex and combinatorial nature of these events” (Reason, 2008, p. 95). 
In his model Reason distinguishes between latent failures – “resident pathogens 
within the system” – and active failures or unsafe acts.  Rather than placing blame on the 
individual actor, Reason argues that: 
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The basic premise of the model was that organizational accidents 
have their primary origins in the fallible decisions made by 
designers, builders and top level management.  These are then 
transmitted via the intervening productive elements – line 
management deficiencies, the psychological precursors of unsafe 
acts, the unsafe acts themselves – to the point where these 
upstream influences combine with local triggers and defensive 
weaknesses to breach the barriers and safeguards (p. 96) 
 In his model Reason describes four distinct levels of human interaction, each 
influencing the next.  What is unique with this model is not just Reason’s insistence on 
the structural contributions to accidents and unsafe acts, but how each successive layer is 
designed to block these untoward occurrences from happening.  In order for an accident 
or error to take place, failures in each of the four levels must occur.  
Each slice – like Emmenthale – has holes in it; but unlike cheese 
the gaps are in continuous motion, moving from place to place, 
opening and shutting.  Only when a series of holes ‘line up’ can an 
accident trajectory pass through the defenses to cause harm to 
people, assets and the environment.  The holes arise from unsafe 
acts (usually short-lived windows of opportunity) and latent 
conditions.  The later occur because the designers, builders, 
managers and operators cannot foresee all possible accident 
scenarios.  They are much more long-lasting than the gaps due to 
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active failures and are present before an adverse event occurs” 
(Reason, 2008, p. 101). 
Reason’s model has become the dominant paradigm safety professionals use to 
discuss accidents and errors.  Its ubiquitousness is illustrated in the following testimony 
by Dr. Ronald Westrum (2000) before the Department of Health and Human Services 
Advisory Committee on Blood Safety and Availability,  
Reason's model has become the common language through which complex 
accidents can be understood. I remember being at one conference where six 
speakers in a row got up and showed Swiss cheese diagrams as a kind of 
academic overkill. The popularity of this model obviously comes from its wide 
application. It's generally felt, as I said, this provides a common ground for 
discussing system safety. 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System   
Because of its widespread acceptance, many have borrowed from and expanded 
upon Reason’s original work.  One of the most popular permutations of Reason’s model 
is the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS).  Initially developed 
for the United States Navy, the HFACS system has become “the most widely used human 
factors analysis framework” in the world (Harris and Li, 2011, p. 109).   
One frequent criticism of Reason’s model is that it did not offer remedial 
solutions (Shappell and Weigmann, 2000).  HFACS seeks to remedy this shortfall by 
offering a framework that “bridges the gap between theory and practice by providing 
safety professionals with a theoretically based tool for identifying and classifying human 
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errors … the system focuses on both latent and active failures and their interrelationships 
and by doing so it facilitates the identification of the underlying cause of human error” 
(Harris and Li, 2011, p. 109).   
The HFACS system examines human error from four distinct viewpoints (levels), 
each building upon the last. 
1. Unsafe Acts of Operators: Active failures proximal to the accident or error. 
2. Preconditions for Unsafe Acts: This level focuses on both latent and active 
failures.   
3. Unsafe Supervision: Latent failures of the system up to the level of the line 
supervisor. 
4. Organizational Influences: The latent failures at this level are the hardest to 
uncover and come to grips with.  They involve the fallible decisions of upper 
management which trickle down through line managers to the individual 
employee. 
The first and second levels of this framework are where the majority of accident 
investigation has traditionally been spent.  The first level looks for violations of 
established policies, procedures, and safety practices.  To add a degree of sophistication 
missing from previous work, Shappell and Weigmann (2000) subdivide these acts into 
two main, and five subcategories: 
1. Errors: “The mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to achieve 
their intended outcome” (p. 3). 
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a. Skill based errors.  “Stick and rudder” skills that occur without 
conscious thought.  Vulnerable to failures of attention and/or memory. 
b. Decision errors.  “Intentional behavior that proceeds as intended, yet 
the plan proves inadequate or inappropriate for the situation” (p. 4).  
Also known as ‘honest mistakes.’ Decision errors can be further 
delineated into: 
i. Procedural errors: rule based mistakes.  These errors occur 
when a situation is either not recognized or misdiagnosed. 
ii. Poor choices:  as the name implies, these errors occur from a 
faulty decision making process.  These types of errors are most 
common when there is a lack of experience on the part of the 
operator and/or excessive external considerations such as time 
constraints. 
iii. Problem solving errors:  these errors occur when the problem is 
poorly understood and there are no procedures to assist in the 
decision making process.  In these situations a novel solution is 
required.  Because of time constraints, these types of decisions 
are often fraught with errors. 
c. Perceptual errors.  These types of errors occur when “sensory input is 
degraded or ‘unusual,’ as is the case with visual illusions and spatial 
disorientation or when aircrew simply misjudge the aircraft’s altitude, 
attitude, or airspeed” (p.5).  When discussing perceptual errors it is 
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important to remember it is not the perception itself that is classified as 
an error; rather the pilot’s erroneous response to the illusion or 
disorientation. 
2. Violations:  “Willful disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe 
flight and, fortunately, occur much less frequently since they often involve 
fatalities” (p.5).  These types of behavior can be further subdivided to include: 
a. Routine violations.  Also known as ‘bending the rules,’ they are 
tolerated to the point of being sanctioned.  A common example would 
be the driver who regularly drives 5-10 miles over the speed limit.   
By definition, if a routine violation is identified as a potential causal 
factor in an error or accident, one must look farther up the chain of 
command to the level where the infraction is condoned. 
b. Exceptional violations.  These abuses are far more serious than routine 
violations.  They are “isolated departures from authority, not 
necessarily indicative of individual’s typical behavior pattern nor 
condoned by management” (p. 6). Flying under a bridge would be an 
example of an exceptional violation.   
It is not the degree of the infraction that makes these violations 
exceptional.  Rather, it is the fact that the behavior does not  reflect a 
person’s usual conduct, and the action is not condoned by management 
that qualifies it as exceptional. 
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Building upon Reason’s original contributions, and realizing that unsafe acts do 
not happen in a vacuum, Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) designed the HFACS 
framework to take into account the systemic features that allowed the unsafe act to occur.  
As outlined above under the section discussing violations, routine violations can only 
occur with the acceptance and support of the authorities.   
The second, third, and forth levels of HFACS attempt to uncover and deal with 
these structural impediments.  HFACS’s second level (Preconditions for Unsafe Acts) 
can be further subdivided into two main and five subordinate categories. 
1. Substandard Conditions of Operators:  These conditions affect the person’s 
readiness to complete the task assigned.  They include: 
a. Adverse mental states.  “Mental conditions that affect performance” 
(p. 7).  Distraction, fatigue, get-home-it is, and task saturation are all 
examples of this precondition. 
b. Adverse physiological states. “Medical or physiological conditions 
that preclude safe operations” (p. 7).  Examples include fatigue, 
illness, and spatial disorientation. 
c. Physical/mental limitations.  This refers to “those instances when 
mission requirements exceed the capabilities of the individual at the 
controls” (p. 8).  Examples include impaired night vision or mental 
saturation and processing difficulties.   
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2. Substandard Practices of Operators:  These are the things that “we do to 
ourselves that set up these substandard conditions” (p. 8).  These practices can 
be roughly categorized as failures of : 
a. Communication – Crew Resource Mismanagement.  This category 
encompasses misfires in communication at all levels: within the 
aircraft, between aircraft, between the aircraft and air traffic control, 
and between the aircraft and ground support units. 
The “classic” example of this type of precondition was the tragic crash 
of a commercial airliner into the Florida Everglades in 1972 “as the 
crew was busily trying to troubleshoot what amounted to a burnt out 
indicator light.  Unfortunately no one in the cockpit was monitoring 
the aircraft’s altitude … as they entered a slow, unrecognized, descent 
into the Everglades, resulting in numerous fatalities” (p. 9). 
b. Personal readiness.  These failures occur when “individuals fail to 
prepare physically or mentally for duty” (p. 9).  Examples include 
violation of the prohibitions against alcohol and drug use, violations of 
crew rest requirements and self-medication with over the counter 
preparations. 
The third HFACS level, unsafe supervision, deals with the latent failures that predispose 
personnel to errors and accidents.  These behaviors include inadequate supervision, planned 
inappropriate operations (requiring behaviors that may be appropriate during an emergency 
during normal business operations), the failure to address known problems, and supervisory 
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violations of established policies and procedures (for example: allowing unauthorized or 
unlicensed personnel to operate company assets). 
It is at this third level that both Reason (2008) and Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) place 
a great deal of emphasis.  Unlike previous models, Reason’s and Shappell and Wiegmann’s work 
highlights the preconditions that must be met in order for an accident/error/unsafe act to take 
place.   
The role of any supervisor is to provide the opportunity to succeed.  
To do this, the supervisor, no matter at what level of operation, 
must provide guidance, training opportunities, leadership, and 
motivation, as well as the proper role model to be emulated … the 
lack of guidance and oversight has proven to be the breeding 
ground for many of the violations that have crept into the cockpit 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, p. 10). 
The fourth and final level in HFACS is concerned with organizational influences.  
These are the strategic decisions that have a profound effect on corporate culture, 
leadership practices, and attitudes on the shop floor.  Organizations are changing as never 
before.  “For example, more than 85% of US Fortune 1000 companies downsized in the 
period 1987 – 1991 and 80% of managers surveyed for the British Institute of 
Management had experienced one or more restructuring programs in the previous five 
years” (Clark, 2003, p. 40).  These changes have a radical effect on an organization’s 
attitude towards safety, errors, and accidents.   
56 
 
A major strategic goal of any business or enterprise is resource management.  
This “encompasses the realm of corporate-level decision making regarding the allocation 
and maintenance of organizational assets such as human resources (personnel), monetary 
assets, and equipment/facilities” (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, p. 11).  During times of 
plenty balancing the needs of safety and profitability are easily accomplished.  However, 
during times of economic austerity, “safety is often the loser …[with] safety and training 
the first to be cut in organizations having financial difficulties” (p. 11). 
The climate – culture or atmosphere – of an organization is also a strategic 
responsibility of upper management.  It is the “unofficial or unspoken rules, values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and customs of an organization.  Culture is the ‘way things really get 
done around here” (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, p. 13).  In terms of safety, this can 
and does have a profound effect on the individual employee.    
A culture that is dedicated to reducing the amount of errors and accidents it 
experiences has to be willing and able to learn from its mistakes. 
The learning culture which surrounds learning from error is often 
compounded by the adoption of strategic defense routines, used to 
pretend that learning has occurred when in actuality there has been 
little understanding and/or a covering up of mistakes, in order to 
avoid “embarrassment” or “threat.” These defense routines become 
normative over time and lead to a range of unwanted 
consequences, such as the repetition of mistakes (Dee and 
Williams, 2011, p. 439). 
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An organization’s policies are also a barometer of its overall safety orientation.  
“When policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or conflicting, or when they are supplanted by 
unofficial rules and values, confusion abounds … [and] safety is bound to suffer” 
(Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, p. 13).   
Finally, the operational processes put in place by upper management set the tone 
for all employees.  “The establishment and use of standardized operating procedures and 
formal methods for maintaining checks and balances (oversight) between the workforce 
and management” are examples of these processes (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2000, p. 
13).   
Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model and HFACS are but two of a myriad of attempts to 
understand the personal and systemic influences that affect aeronautical decision making.  
As this field of inquiry matures, more sophisticated models will be developed that will 
help explain why pilots and air crew members make the decisions they do. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Research Questions 
This research is being conducted in an attempt to understand the effect local base 
finances and mission orientation (the Kelly Effect) have on the go/no go decision in 
HEMS.  As the above discussions have shown, the vast majority of HEMS accidents are 
the result of faulty decision making, not mechanical issues.  This research is designed to 
examine the effect of these factors on aeronautical decision making. 
The majority of HEMS operators in the United States operate under a “3 to go, 1 
to say no” philosophy.  This means everyone aboard the aircraft, not just the Pilot in 
Command, is responsible for the decision to accept or reject a flight.  For this reason both 
aeromedical crew members as well as pilots have been included in this study. 
The research questions posed by this study are: 
1. Do negative base finances (a base that is doing poorly financially and may be 
in danger of closing) adversely influence the go/no go decision?  Are pilots 
and aeromedical crewmembers more likely to accept a flight under marginal 
conditions if their base is performing poorly financially than those 
crewmembers that are located at a base that is financially stable? 
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2. Does a commitment to completing the mission, regardless of the cost, 
negatively influence the go/no go decision?  Are pilots and aeromedical crew 
members with a high degree of mission valence more likely to accept a flight 
under marginal conditions than those pilots and crewmembers who do not 
share a similar “mission is sacrosanct” orientation? 
Hypothesis 
1. A base’s poor financial performance will negatively impact a pilot’s or 
aeromedical crew member’s decision making process.  A pilot or 
crewmember from a base that is in danger of being closed because of poor 
financial performance will be more likely to accept a flight under marginal 
conditions than a pilot or crewmember from a more financially solvent base. 
2. Pilots and crewmembers who have a high degree of mission orientation and 
mission valence will be more likely to accept a flight under marginal 
conditions than a pilot or crew member who does not have as great an internal 
compulsion to complete the mission. 
The Survey 
To test the above hypothesis, a Likert type survey was developed to measure the 
emphasis HEMS pilots and aeromedical crew members placed on financial 
considerations and mission orientation (Appendix A).  Besides a very limited amount of 
general demographic information, the survey consists of a series of statements the 
participants are asked to rate on a scale of 1-5, with one being strongly disagree and 5 
being strongly agree. 
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Although a total of twenty-one questions were included on the survey, one 
question “As PIC, if I think the mission is doable I will try and convince the medical 
crew to accept the flight, even if they are hesitant” was dropped because it applied only to 
pilots.   
Survey Construction 
Surveys have long been a staple of social science research (Allen & Seaman, 
2007; Hodge & Gillespie, 2007; Ison, 2010).  They are “an apposite method when trying 
to gather attributes of large populations … [and to] make comparisons among subgroups 
of the population and gather statistically representative data” (Ison, 2010, p. 5).   
Likewise, Likert scales are a common format for surveys (Allen & Seaman, 2007; 
Hodge & Gillespie, 2007).  Developed by Rensis Likert, these scales are used to measure 
attitudes.  “An individual is confronted with statements which are essentially value 
judgments. The value judgments may concern the individual’s reflections of reality or the 
individual’s psychic dispositions as feelings, wants, desires, conative dispositions. The 
individual is invited to define his attitude towards each statement by choosing among a 
number of r grades (scores, degrees) on the r-grade Likert scale” (Gob, McCollin, & 
Fernanda Ramalhoto, 2007, p. 604).  These types of surveys are common not only in the 
social sciences, but in customer satisfaction surveys where they are employed to measure 
a stakeholders attitudes about a product or service.   
One difficulty with Likert surveys is the statistical analysis of the data.  
Statisticians have traditionally grouped data into four main categories:  nominal data is 
that which is purely descriptive in nature; it is the broadest category and is useful for 
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categorization.  Ordinal data is used to rank responses, but there is no indication of 
distance between the rankings; “the intervals between values cannot be presumed equal” 
(Jamieson, 2004, p. 1217).  Conversely, interval data has a defined interval between the 
ranking points and ratio data is that which “meaningful ordering, distance, decimals and 
fractions between variables is possible” (Allen & Seaman, 2007, p. 64).   
By these definitions the data recovered using Likert scales is purely ordinal in 
nature.  This limits the data’s usefulness.  As ordinal, the only analysis available to the 
researcher is rough groupings and number plots showing the frequency of a particular 
response.  While this is valuable in making comparisons between groups, it does not 
allow for more sophisticated statistical analysis. 
While there is no agreed upon standard (Gob, et.al., 2007), some researchers 
believe it is appropriate to treat the ordinal data gathered in Likert surveys as interval, 
opening up the possibility of parametric testing (Pell, 2005; Blaikie, 2003).  According to 
Pell (2005), “the numbers have no memory of how they were generated, and some 
procedures are more robust than others, … where there is an equivalent non-parametric 
test, it should be remembered that these are less powerful than the corresponding 
parametric test, so care should be exercised in drawing inference from any test statistics 
close to the critical value.” 
As stated above, the treatment of ordinal data as interval is not without its 
detractors.  Allen and Seaman (2007) believe in a limited use and application for this 
practice. “While Likert scale variables usually represent an underlying continuous 
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measure, analysis of individual items should use parametric procedures only as a pilot 
analysis.” 
Cognizant of this controversy, the author of this study has chosen to use basic 
parametric testing on a very limited basis, comparing the average responses between 
groups.  The majority of the analysis is more descriptive in nature, keeping with the 
standard conventions of dealing with ordinal data. 
Survey Validity 
Validity can be defined as “the extent to which a measure or test encompasses a 
specified content area” (Porter, 2011, p.46).  In other words, does the tool being used 
actually measure desired data point being sought?   
According to Ison (2010), one way to test the validity of an instrument is to use a 
panel of experts to assess the questions being asked.  Towards this end the author of this 
study used a sample of coworkers of varying disciplines to evaluate the survey statements 
before they were uploaded onto the internet survey site. 
Two pilots and three medical crew members (a respiratory therapist who is also a 
regional HEMS manager, a Registered Nurse, and a Paramedic) all agreed to take the 
survey and offer their comments.  The team’s comments were incorporated into the final 
survey design. 
Participants 
Participation in the survey was anonymous and completely voluntary.  To collect 
data for this study, emails containing a link to an electronic survey were sent to 
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individuals via the corporate email system of a major, multinational HEMS provider.  
This provider is the second largest provider of HEMS services in the United States, with 
bases across the country and in several foreign countries.  Recipients of the corporate 
email were also asked to forward the link to other HEMS providers not associated with 
the company.  An effort to enhance participation was made by listings and a link to the 
survey placed on social network sites and user groups dedicated to HEMS professionals. 
Protection of Human Subjects 
Participants who volunteered their time and opinions did so at no jeopardy to 
themselves.  Participants remained anonymous throughout the entire process except for 
the generalized demographic data queried at the beginning of the survey and could have 
withdrawn at any time during the process without consequence. The study author notified 
and received written permission from the management of the HEMS provider to conduct 
the survey.  In the letter introducing the study to the organization’s employees, the letter 
expressly stated that participation was voluntary and not a requirement of employment.  
None of the questions in the survey will enable any person to identify either the pilot or 
air medical crewmember or where they practice. Finally, the Institutional Review Board 
at the University of North Dakota reviewed and approved the project including the survey 
questions, proposed sample, and research methods. 
Results 
There were a total of 176 responses: 77 pilots and 99 air medical crew members.  
There is a distinct breakdown by sex, with 94.8% of the pilots and 64.6% of air crew 
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members being male (figure 1).  The most common age among air medical crew 
members was 36-45 while that of pilots was slightly older: 46-55. 
 
Figure 2: Gender Breakdown by Occupation 
The responses to the twenty Likert statements, delineated by profession, and 
graphed, are found in Appendix B.  A brief summation follows. 
The overall responses to the statements regarding mission orientation (Likert 
statements number 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20) showed no particular 
affinity for taking excessive risks in order to complete the mission.  This would seem to 
disprove the hypothesis that “pilots and crewmembers who have a high degree of mission 
orientation and mission valence will be more likely to accept a flight under marginal 
conditions than a pilot or crew member who does not have as great an internal 
compulsion to complete the mission.” 
Even though the overall results disprove the hypothesis, there is a noticeable, 
although not always statistically significant, difference between professions in terms of 
the results.  On Likert statement # 1: “Completing the Mission is my Highest Priority,” a 
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total of 58.6% of all respondents indicated that they either disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with the statement (Table 1).  However, as a percentage of the total occupational 
category, pilots were more likely to be neutral (by 10 percentage points) or agree than 
either RN or Paramedics. 
Table 1:  Likert statement # 1 with Percentages 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Completing the 
mission is my highest 
priority 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Count 14 11 12 37 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
37.8% 29.7% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within Certification 19.2% 28.2% 26.7% 23.6% 
% of Total 8.9% 7.0% 7.6% 23.6% 
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Disagree Count 25 15 15 55 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
45.5% 27.3% 27.3% 100.0% 
% within Certification 34.2% 38.5% 33.3% 35.0% 
% of Total 15.9% 9.6% 9.6% 35.0% 
 
Neutral Count 22 8 8 38 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
57.9% 21.1% 21.1% 100.0% 
% within Certification 30.1% 20.5% 17.8% 24.2% 
% of Total 14.0% 5.1% 5.1% 24.2% 
Agree Count 10 4 7 21 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
47.6% 19.0% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Certification 13.7% 10.3% 15.6% 13.4% 
% of Total 6.4% 2.5% 4.5% 13.4% 
Strongly Agree Count 2 1 3 6 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
33.3% 16.7% 50.0% 100.0% 
% within Certification 2.7% 2.6% 6.7% 3.8% 
% of Total 1.3% .6% 1.9% 3.8% 
Total Count 73 39 45 157 
% within Completing 
the mission is my 
highest priority 
46.5% 24.8% 28.7% 100.0% 
% within Certification 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 46.5% 24.8% 28.7% 100.0% 
 
A similar disparity can be found with Likert statement # 2: “Minimums Are 
Absolute, I Do Not Push Them.”  Again, as with Likert Statement # 1, the preponderance 
of responses disproved the hypothesis that excessive mission orientation leads pilots and 
air medical crew members to take inappropriate risks when deciding to accept or reject a 
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flight.  While over 90% of all respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, a very small 
percentage of pilots were either neutral or disagreed (Table 2), this compared with zero 
Registered Nurses and only one Paramedic.   
 
Table 2: Likert statement #2 with Percentages 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
Disagree Count 2 0 1 3 
% within Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
66.7% .0% 33.3% 100.0% 
% within Certification 2.7% .0% 2.2% 1.9% 
% of Total 1.3% .0% .6% 1.9% 
Neutral Count 4 0 0 4 
% within Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
100.0% .0% .0% 100.0% 
% within Certification 5.4% .0% .0% 2.5% 
% of Total 2.5% .0% .0% 2.5% 
Agree Count 21 6 12 39 
% within Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
53.8% 15.4% 30.8% 100.0% 
% within Certification 28.4% 15.4% 26.7% 24.7% 
% of Total 13.3% 3.8% 7.6% 24.7% 
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Strongly 
Agree 
Count 47 33 32 112 
% within Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
42.0% 29.5% 28.6% 100.0% 
% within Certification 63.5% 84.6% 71.1% 70.9% 
% of Total 29.7% 20.9% 20.3% 70.9% 
Total Count 74 39 45 158 
% within Minimums are 
absolute.  I do not push 
them. 
46.8% 24.7% 28.5% 100.0% 
% within Certification 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 46.8% 24.7% 28.5% 100.0% 
 
In a One Way ANOVA conducted on the data, Likert statement # 2 produced a 
statistically significant difference (.035) between the various occupational groups 
(Appendix C).  Post Hoc Tukey and Bonferroni testing shows that the difference lays 
between the RN and pilot responses. 
Statistically significant differences between the means can be found in Likert 
statements 2, 3, 9, 12, 13 and 20.  In every case except Likert Statement # 9, the 
difference lies between the pilot and a member of the medical crew.  For Likert Statement # 
9, the difference was between the RN and the Paramedic. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
The problem of faulty aeronautical decision making in HEMS is well documented 
and researched.  What has yet to be determined is why these accidents continue to happen 
despite an unprecedented amount of attention by the FAA, NTSB, and industry 
organizations.   
The purpose of this study is to determine what role, if any, local base finances and 
mission orientation play in the go/no go decision among HEMS aircrews.   
The data from this study clearly rejects the two experimental hypotheses: those 
personnel from financially tenuous bases are more likely to undertake flights in marginal 
conditions compared to crewmembers from more financially stable bases; and a hyper 
sense of mission valence – the Kelly Effect – would encourage HEMS pilots and medical 
personnel to accept flights under marginal conditions. 
In every instance, the pilots and medical crews rejected both hypotheses.  Their 
answers to the Likert statements were overwhelmingly in keeping with established safety 
practices.  What is interesting is the difference in responses by occupation.  There is a 
statistically significant difference between pilot and air medical crew responses in 25% of 
the Likert statements.   
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One reason for this difference may be the comfort level of each crewmember in 
relation to the flight environment.  As one HEMS pilot succinctly put it, “if I am worried 
about how things are going, you will probably be terrified” (Clark, 2012).   
As detailed previously, all HEMS pilots have at a minimum a Commercial Pilot 
certificate and 2000 hours total flight time.  Most have considerably more.  In 
comparison, the medical crew may be experiencing their first flight in a helicopter the 
day they are released from the training academy.  There is no requirement for previous 
flight experience among medical crewmembers. 
Because of this, many medical crew members are hesitant aviators at best.  The 
flight environment is unique: the sights, sounds, and sensations are unlike any 
experienced in the course of a “normal,” non-aviation medical career.  Just as a pilot 
becomes more comfortable with his/her role as Pilot In Command (PIC) with experience, 
medical crew members become more familiar – and accepting – of the peculiarities of 
flying as their experience grows. 
Because of the flight experience requirements, HEMS is a “second career” for 
many pilots.  In the past, the majority of HEMS pilots came from the military; many 
having flown in Vietnam or Iraq during the first Gulf War. 
Today, this is not necessarily the case.  Many of the new generation of HEMS 
pilots come from a strictly civilian background; working their way up through the ranks 
as flight instructors and/or tour pilots in either Las Vegas or the Grand Canyon.   
PHI Air Medical is a subsidiary of Petroleum Helicopters Incorporated (PHI), the 
largest operator of helicopters in the United States outside of the Department of Defense.  
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PHI’s main business is moving men and material to and from the oil rigs in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  Because of this, a large number of PHI Air Medical pilots have spent time 
flying in “the Gulf,” where low ceilings, rain, and a hostile flight environment are the 
norm.  This has a profound effect on their comfort level and willingness to venture into 
marginal weather conditions. 
This experience may be a factor in the disparity between pilots and medical crew 
on Likert statement number two: “Minimums are absolute.  I do not push them.” 
To a novice crewmember, marginal ceilings or rain may be a cause for concern 
simply because of the novelty of the situation.  Having never flown through rain before, 
the medical crewmember may be fearful of its effect, especially if their only exposure to 
the subject is the scant weather lecture given during initial training.  In comparison, to a 
seasoned pilot, especially one who flew in the Gulf of Mexico, marginal ceilings and rain 
are hardly a cause for concern. 
Comfort level in the flight environment may also be a contributing factor to the 
statistically significant difference between pilots and medical crew members on Likert 
statement number thirteen: “Just because another aircraft has turned down the flight is no 
reason to think we cannot do it.” 
This question reflects the regional nature of HEMS.  In many areas of the country 
there is only one provider or one aircraft servicing a particular area.  In other areas, such 
as Arizona, there are multiple providers and multiple aircraft servicing the same 
geographic area. 
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In these situations, unless a specific aircraft or provider is requested by the ground 
crew (scene call) or facility (inter facility transfer), the call goes to the closest aircraft.  
After receiving the request, the dispatch center then must check with the pilot to see 
whether or not crew is willing to accept the flight. 
Because it is rare to have several aircraft co-located at the same airport or within a 
few miles of each other, depending upon the type of weather that caused the first aircraft 
to refuse the flight (isolated thunderstorms), it is possible that another aircraft can indeed 
complete the flight safely. 
“Helicopter shopping” by the requesting agency has been reported by the NTSB 
(2009) as a causative factor in several HEMS crashes.  Because of this, CAMTS 
standards require that the pilot and medical crew be made aware that the flight was turned 
down by another aircraft before accepting the mission.  As with the marginal ceilings 
example given above, a pilot’s increased comfort with the flight environment when 
compared to the medical crew may lead the pilot to believe it is safe to “go and check it 
out,” and accept a flight that has been turned down by another aircraft or provider.  
In addition to the issue of comfort level with the flight environment, the author of 
this study believes an occupational culture geared towards accepting a flight, even when 
conditions are approaching organizational or legislated minimums is a powerful 
motivating force for pilots.   
As discussed previously, many HEMS pilots come from a military background.  
In the military, completing the mission is primary.  Major Kelly’s willingness to falsify 
records in order to keep flying is illustrative of this mindset.  As one blogger put it, 
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“Duty, mission, and service are all at the heart of the military mindset and serve as focal 
points in training across the Armed Forces … These ideals are the motivators that drive 
young men and women to push their limits of endurance and risk their lives in service to 
the country” (Connell, 2009).   
Commercial pilots are also occupationally enculturated to complete the mission 
unless it is absolutely prohibitive to do so.    In the hyper-competitive commercial airline 
industry, not flying often means not getting paid.  It can also mean disrupting the lives of 
passengers and crew down the line as one flight cancellation snowballs into tens or 
hundreds of missed flights and/or connections. 
Medical crewmembers are not necessarily trained with this same hyper-vigilant 
mindset.  In fact, paramedics are specifically trained to avoid entering situations that are 
potentially dangerous until the threat has been allayed.  “Is the scene safe?” is the first 
question a paramedic is taught to ask before approaching any patient encounter. 
This emphasis on “scene safety” is a hallmark of Emergency Medical Services.  
Nurses, emergency medical technicians and paramedics are all trained with the belief that 
dead or injured rescuers are not only of no use to the people they were dispatched to help, 
but are a burden to the crews that must now contend not only with the original victims, 
but the injured crew members as well. 
 The collision of these two cultures – one in which the mission is nearly 
sacrosanct and another that preaches caution in the face of an external threat – may help 
explain the differences in responses between occupational groups. 
  
74 
 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study are numerous; not the least of which is the non-
representative sample size.  There are an estimated 800 aircraft engaged in HEMS in the 
United States.  Each aircraft has a minimum of four pilots, four Registered Nurses and 
four Paramedics plus one to three mechanics assigned to it.  Given the limited sample 
size of this study, making any broad based judgments is impossible. 
The study is also limited by the participant group.  Participants in this study were 
primarily from one company.  Although from various geographic areas, the standardized 
policies and procedures these professionals operate under may unduly bias the responses.  
For this reason it is impossible to make large, sweeping, generalizations from the 
available data.  It would be helpful to have more broad based participation, especially 
from other providers who operate nationally and internationally.   
Finally, a major limitation of this particular study is the bluntness of the 
instrument used.  Likert type surveys are a respected and validated methodology.  That 
said, relying solely on subjective self-reporting measures leaves much to be desired.   
Self-reporting surveys are by definition fraught with problems.  One of the largest 
problems associated with self-reporting is Self-Serving Bias (SSB).  Heider (1958) wrote 
that a person’s attributions in any given situation are clouded by their “own needs or 
wishes” (p. 118).  SSB is a defense mechanism designed to protect or enhance one’s self-
image or concept.  At its core, it is the propensity to take credit for personal successes 
while blaming external forces for personal failures (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999).  
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In addition to SSB, self-reporting tools must contend with the issue of 
misinterpretation of the survey questions and errors of “social desirability.”  In one study, 
only 29% of the respondents interpreted commonly used survey questions in an 
acceptable way (Raitasalo, 2003).  The respondents simply did not grasp what the 
question was asking. 
This study by necessity includes some fairly technical concepts.  The increased 
technicality of the subject matter can lead to confusion if there is misunderstanding over 
definitions.  Several of the Likert statements deal with weather minimums.  Is the medical 
crew’s understanding of weather minimums the same as the pilots, and do both have a 
similar understanding of the consequences for exceeding these parameters?   
For the medical crew, exceeding minimums may simply be a worrisome 
occurrence during a difficult flight.  For a commercial pilot, it may mean termination and 
the revocation of their pilot certificate. 
Social desirability refers to the inclination of the respondent to tell the surveyor 
what they believe the surveyor wants to hear.  This is especially the case if the results 
may indicate unsavory attitudes or illegal activities (Stat Trek, 2012).  This point is 
especially salient given the nature of the heavily regulated nature of the HEMS industry.  
Errors of social desirability are lessened the more confident the respondent is that the data 
is confidential; however, it is impossible to totally erase this bias.   
In an effort to avoid as much ambiguity as possible, and to reduce the amount of 
SSB associated with the questions, the author of this study chose to use short and strongly 
worded phrases.  Unfortunately, there is a trade off with this decision.  By using short and 
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declarative statements, the author may have lost a degree of sophistication that would 
have been present in a more precise and inclusive statements. 
Further Research 
The preliminary findings indicating a difference may exist along occupational 
lines beg further investigation.  Since both hypotheses were convincingly rejected, just 
how great is this difference?  Is the difference the result of inborn personality traits (pilot 
personality) or education?  How do Flight Nurses and Flight Paramedics compare to 
members of their professions who do not fly?  Is there a gender difference?   
Future research into these questions would best be accomplished with the use of 
scenario based surveys and simulations.  Because setting up realistic scenario based 
simulations is expensive and time consuming, one technique that offers promise for 
further research is the use of situational judgment tests to evaluate pilot and medical crew 
attitudes towards various factors affecting the go/no go decision. 
Situational judgment tests can be defined as “any paper –and-pencil test designed 
to measure judgment in work settings.  Some of these tests can be classified as 
situational, in that a scenario is described and the respondent must identity the 
appropriate response from a list of alternatives” (McDaniel, Morgeson, Finnegan, 
Campion, & Braverman, 2001, p. 730). 
A situational judgment test typically consists of scenarios depicting 
an often-complex situation that reflects the dimensions of interest.  
Some number of alternative solutions (usually four or five) to each 
situation are presented from which the person being assessed must 
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choose the best, and sometimes the worst, solution.  The person’s 
performance is scored by reference to the solutions recommended 
by a panel of subject matter experts (Hunter, 2003, p. 376). 
These tests were first developed in the 1990s, and their efficacy has been well 
documented (Hunter, 2003).  Situational judgment tests have the advantage of presenting 
the subject with a complex, real life scenario without the cost and inconvenience of 
attempting to recreate these same scenarios in a laboratory setting.   
Of course the “Gold Standard” of any further research would be a detailed 
scenario based simulation during which a representative aircrew (pilot, nurse, and 
paramedic or respiratory therapist) was presented with a scenario that entailed either 
accepting or rejecting a flight based on available information, or terminating a flight mid-
mission because of a safety concern (weather, mechanical malfunction). 
Inherent in any live, scenario based testing is the danger of the Hawthorne Effect 
skewing the results.  The Hawthorne Effect is the propensity of the subject to change 
their behavior simply because they know they are being observed.  McCarney, Warner, 
Iliffe, Haselen, Griffin, & Fisher (2007) describe it this way: 
The Hawthorne Effect was first reported following an extensive 
research programme investigating methods of increasing 
productivity in the Western Electrical Company's Hawthorne 
Works in Chicago during the 1920s and 30s. The finding of 
enduring interest was that no matter what change was introduced to 
working conditions, the result was increased productivity … It has 
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been defined as ‘an increase in worker productivity produced by 
the psychological stimulus of being singled out and made to feel 
important’ (p. 731). 
To mitigate the deleterious consequences of the Hawthorne Effect, such scenario 
based testing would best be carried out in a confidential setting where the researchers 
were not readily apparent.  A mockup of a crew quarters area or aircraft hangar that was 
equipped with video and audio recording equipment, as well as internet access for 
checking the simulated weather conditions and a radio/phone link with dispatch and/or 
the EOC would be ideal.   
Conclusion 
Helicopter Emergency Medical Systems is among the most dangerous type of 
flying in the United States today.  The reasons for this are complex, multifaceted, and 
remain poorly understood.  At the crux of the problem is poor aeronautical decision 
making. 
This study attempts to discover what effect, if any, poor base finances and a 
hyper-mission orientation had on the go/no go decision.  Utilizing a Likert type survey 
tool, the author of this study queried HEMS professionals from across the country to 
assess their attitudes. 
The data clearly and unambiguously rejects both hypotheses under study.  Of 
great interest was the discovery of a statistically significant difference in responses 
between air medical crew members and pilots in 25% of the Likert statements.  The 
reasons for these differences are unclear and not adequately answered by this study.  
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Possible reasons for the differences include: an increased comfort level with the overall 
flight environment by pilots when compared to medical crew, and a different 
occupational enculturation regarding mission valence and mission completion between 
commercial pilots and air medical crewmembers.   
This study expands the knowledge base regarding decision making in HEMS by 
showing that poor base finances and a hyper sense of mission orientation do not 
negatively affect the go/no go decision overall.  It also points out several areas that beg 
further study. 
The author of this study believes further exploration of the difference in survey 
responses between occupational categories is paramount.  Towards this goal the author of 
this study would suggest further surveys be conducted using situational judgment tests 
and live scenario based simulations to gauge participant reactions under carefully 
recreated conditions.   
It is the author’s contention that the triangulation afforded by these different 
modalities would offer the most comprehensive and useful data. 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
APPENDIX A 
Survey Tool 
 
Demographics: 
Sex (Gender) M F    
Age 18-25 26-35 36-45 46-
55 
>55 
 
Pilot: 
Highest Certificate Presently Held Commercial Instrument CFI ATP  
Total Hours 0 -1999 2000-3999 4000-
5999 
6000-
7999 
8000-
9999 
Total Helicopter Hours 0-1999 2000-2999 3000-
3999 
4000-
4999 
>5000 
How would you describe your 
program? 
Traditional Community    
Does your organization have a 
Safety Management System in 
place 
Y N    
Does your organization have an 
Emergency Operations Center 
capable of vetoing a flight  
Y N    
Does your organization adhere to 
a “3 to go, 1 to say no” 
philosophy? 
Y N    
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Air Medical Crewmember: 
Highest Certification/Licensure 
Presently Held 
MD RN Paramedic RT Other 
Total years in your specialty 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-
19 
>20 
Total years flying EMS missions 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-
15 
>15 
How would you describe your 
program* 
Traditional Community    
Does your organization have a 
Safety Management System in 
place 
Y N    
Does your organization have an 
Emergency Operations Center 
capable of vetoing a flight  
Y N    
Does your organization adhere to 
a “3 to go, 1 to say no” 
philosophy? 
Y N    
*A traditional program is one owned and operated by a hospital or healthcare 
entity.  The hospital provides the medical staff and a third party vendor usually 
provides the aircraft, flight crew, maintenance services and Part 135 certificate.  A 
community based program is a stand-alone air ambulance operator, usually for 
profit, that operates under their own Part 135 certificate and is covered by the 
Airline Deregulation Act.   
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Survey Questions 
 
 Strongly 
Agree 
   Strongly 
Disagree 
Completing the mission is my highest priority 5 4 3 2 1 
Minimums are absolute.  I do not push them. 5 4 3 2 1 
The patient’s / customer’s needs come first 5 4 3 2 1 
I routinely review my base’s financial performance 5 4 3 2 1 
It is not my emergency 5 4 3 2 1 
I would duck below minimums to complete the 
mission 
5 4 3 2 1 
I worry about the possibility of my base being 
closed because of poor performance 
5 4 3 2 1 
During the past month I have asked about a patient’s 
payer status 
5 4 3 2 1 
I never turn down a flight on the basis of radar data 
alone; I prefer to actually see what it actually going 
on.  
5 4 3 2 1 
I would consider dipping into my fuel reserve in 
order to successfully complete the flight 
5 4 3 2 1 
Regulations do not promote safety 5 4 3 2 1 
The base’s financial performance is not my problem 5 4 3 2 1 
Just because another aircraft has turned down the 
flight is no reason to think we cannot do it. 
5 4 3 2 1 
As PIC, if I think the mission is doable I will try and 
convince the medical crew to accept the flight, even 
if they are hesitant. 
5 4 3 2 1 
The Emergency Operations Center is a resource, I 
am PIC, I decide whether or not to accept a flight 
5 4 3 2 1 
Turning down a flight equates to revenue we cannot 
afford to lose. 
5 4 3 2 1 
They do not call us unless they need us.  If they call 
it is our responsibility to get the job done 
5 4 3 2 1 
I do not accept a flight unless I am sure we can 5 4 3 2 1 
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complete it safely and within the standards 
I do not know whether or not my base is in the black 
(making a profit) 
5 4 3 2 1 
If the weather is marginal, I do not mind waiting till 
it clears; the patient will still be there 
5 4 3 2 1 
During the last year I have deviated from the 
operations manual in order to complete a flight 
5 4 3 2 1 
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APPENDIX B 
LIKERT RESPONSES 
 
Completing the mission is my highest priority * Certification Crosstabulation 
 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Completing the mission is my 
highest priority 
Strongly Disagree 14 11 12 37 
Disagree 25 15 15 55 
Neutral 22 8 8 38 
Agree 10 4 7 21 
Strongly Agree 2 1 3 6 
Total 73 39 45 157 
Table 3: Likert statement # 1 
 
Figure 3: Likert statement # 1 
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Minimums are absolute.  I do not push them. * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Minimums are absolute.  I do 
not push them. 
Disagree 2 0 1 3 
Neutral 4 0 0 4 
Agree 21 6 12 39 
Strongly Agree 47 33 32 112 
Total 74 39 45 158 
Table 2: Likert statement # 2 
 
Figure 4: Likert statement # 2 
*Statement #2 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups (.035).  Post hoc 
testing showed the difference to be between the pilot and RN. 
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The patient’s / customer’s needs come first * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
The patient’s / customer’s 
needs come first 
Strongly Disagree 9 7 2 18 
Disagree 35 14 13 62 
Neutral 17 6 13 36 
Agree 7 9 13 29 
Strongly Agree 5 3 4 12 
Total 73 39 45 157 
Table 5: Likert statement # 3 
 
Figure 5: Likert statement # 3 
*Statement #3 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups 
(.022).  Post hoc testing showed the difference to be between the pilot and paramedic. 
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I routinely review my base’s financial performance * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I routinely review my base’s 
financial performance 
Strongly Disagree 24 9 10 43 
Disagree 18 6 11 35 
Neutral 15 10 11 36 
Agree 14 11 7 32 
Strongly Agree 3 2 6 11 
Total 74 38 45 157 
Table 6: Likert statement # 4 
 
Figure 6: Likert statement # 4 
 
  
88 
 
It is not my emergency * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
It is not my emergency Strongly Disagree 6 2 1 9 
Disagree 4 6 8 18 
Neutral 14 13 8 35 
Agree 32 12 12 56 
Strongly Agree 18 6 16 40 
Total 74 39 45 158 
Table 7: Likert statement # 5 
 
Figure 7: Likert statement # 5 
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I would duck below minimums to complete the mission * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I would duck below minimums 
to complete the mission 
Strongly Disagree 42 27 30 99 
Disagree 25 9 13 47 
Neutral 7 3 2 12 
Total 74 39 45 158 
Table 8: Likert statement # 6 
 
Figure 8: Likert statement # 6 
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I worry about the possibility of my base being closed because of poor performance * Certification 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I worry about the possibility of 
my base being closed because 
of poor performance 
Strongly Disagree 10 9 13 32 
Disagree 19 13 14 46 
Neutral 17 7 6 30 
Agree 23 7 10 40 
Strongly Agree 4 3 2 9 
Total 73 39 45 157 
Table 9: Likert statement # 7 
 
Figure 9: Likert statement # 7 
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During the past month I have asked about a patient’s payer status * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
During the past month I have 
asked about a patient’s payer 
status 
Strongly Disagree 32 25 19 76 
Disagree 18 8 15 41 
Neutral 7 0 1 8 
Agree 16 5 7 28 
Strongly Agree 1 1 3 5 
Total 74 39 45 158 
Table 10: Likert statement # 8 
 
Figure 10: Likert statement # 8 
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I never turn down a flight on the basis of radar data alone; I prefer to actually see what it actually going 
on. * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I never turn down a flight on the 
basis of radar data alone; I 
prefer to actually see what it 
actually going on. 
Strongly Disagree 21 16 7 44 
Disagree 30 16 21 67 
Neutral 10 5 7 22 
Agree 10 2 7 19 
Strongly Agree 2 0 2 4 
Total 73 39 44 156 
Table 11: Likert statement # 9 
 
Figure 11: Likert statement # 9 
*Statement #9 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups (.022).  Post hoc 
testing showed the difference to be between the RN and Paramedic.  
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I would consider dipping into my fuel reserve in order to successfully complete the flight * Certification 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I would consider dipping into 
my fuel reserve in order to 
successfully complete the flight 
Strongly Disagree 34 28 25 87 
Disagree 30 7 15 52 
Neutral 7 2 1 10 
Agree 2 2 2 6 
Strongly Agree 0 0 1 1 
Total 73 39 44 156 
Table 12: Likert statement # 10 
 
Figure 12: Likert statement # 10 
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Regulations do not promote safety * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Regulations do not promote 
safety 
Strongly Disagree 29 22 20 71 
Disagree 22 9 15 46 
Neutral 12 6 4 22 
Agree 7 1 5 13 
Strongly Agree 3 0 1 4 
Total 73 38 45 156 
Table 13: Likert statement # 11 
 
Figure 13: Likert statement # 11 
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The base’s financial performance is not my problem * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
The base’s financial 
performance is not my problem 
Strongly Disagree 8 10 6 24 
Disagree 24 17 20 61 
Neutral 20 10 6 36 
Agree 11 2 9 22 
Strongly Agree 11 0 4 15 
Total 74 39 45 158 
Table 14: Likert statement # 12 
 
Figure 14: Likert statement # 12 
*Statement #12 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups (.002).  Post hoc 
testing showed the difference to be between the pilot and RN.  
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Just because another aircraft has turned down the flight is no reason to think we cannot do it. * 
Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Just because another aircraft 
has turned down the flight is no 
reason to think we cannot do it. 
Strongly Disagree 8 9 10 27 
Disagree 23 21 12 56 
Neutral 19 5 11 35 
Agree 20 4 9 33 
Strongly Agree 3 0 3 6 
Total 73 39 45 157 
Table 15: Likert statement # 13 
 
Figure 15: Likert statement # 13 
*Statement #13 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups (.004).  Post hoc 
testing showed the difference to be between the pilot and RN.  
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Turning down a flight equates to revenue we cannot afford to lose. * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
Turning down a flight equates 
to revenue we cannot afford to 
lose. 
Strongly Disagree 27 19 20 66 
Disagree 30 15 14 59 
Neutral 12 4 7 23 
Agree 5 0 2 7 
Strongly Agree 0 1 0 1 
Total 74 39 43 156 
Table 16: Likert statement # 14 
 
Figure 16: Likert statement # 14 
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They do not call us unless they need us.  If they call it is our responsibility to get the job done * 
Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
They do not call us unless they 
need us.  If they call it is our 
responsibility to get the job 
done 
Strongly Disagree 13 9 15 37 
Disagree 35 19 19 73 
Neutral 17 9 3 29 
Agree 9 0 5 14 
Strongly Agree 0 2 2 4 
Total 74 39 44 157 
Table 17: Likert statement # 15 
 
Figure 17: Likert statement # 15 
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I do not accept a flight unless I am sure we can complete it safely and within the standards * 
Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I do not accept a flight unless I 
am sure we can complete it 
safely and within the standards 
Disagree 2 0 1 3 
Neutral 2 0 0 2 
Agree 16 10 11 37 
Strongly Agree 54 29 32 115 
Total 74 39 44 157 
Table 18: Likert statement # 16 
 
Figure 18: Likert statement # 16 
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I do not know whether or not my base is in the black (making a profit) * Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
I do not know whether or not 
my base is in the black (making 
a profit) 
Strongly Disagree 9 4 5 18 
Disagree 22 15 16 53 
Neutral 19 12 8 39 
Agree 12 5 8 25 
Strongly Agree 12 3 6 21 
Total 74 39 43 156 
Table 19: Likert statement # 17 
 
Figure 19: Likert statement # 17 
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If the weather is marginal, I do not mind waiting till it clears; the patient will still be there * Certification 
Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
If the weather is marginal, I do 
not mind waiting till it clears; the 
patient will still be there 
Strongly Disagree 0 1 0 1 
Disagree 2 2 2 6 
Neutral 18 8 11 37 
Agree 36 16 19 71 
Strongly Agree 18 12 12 42 
Total 74 39 44 157 
Table 20: Likert statement # 18 
 
Figure 20: Likert statement # 18 
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During the last year I have deviated from the operations manual in order to complete a flight * 
Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
During the last year I have 
deviated from the operations 
manual in order to complete a 
flight 
Strongly Disagree 36 24 22 82 
Disagree 23 8 19 50 
Neutral 9 4 0 13 
Agree 6 2 2 10 
Total 74 38 43 155 
Table 21: Likert statement # 19 
 
Figure 21: Likert statement # 19 
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The Emergency Operations Center is a resource, I am PIC, I decide whether or not to accept a flight * 
Certification Crosstabulation 
Count 
 
Certification 
Total Pilot RN EMT-P 
The Emergency Operations 
Center is a resource, I am PIC, 
I decide whether or not to 
accept a flight 
Strongly Disagree 9 12 10 31 
Disagree 16 6 16 38 
Neutral 17 8 5 30 
Agree 23 5 5 33 
Strongly Agree 8 1 3 12 
Total 73 32 39 144 
Table 22: Likert statement # 20 
 
Figure 22: Likert statement # 20 
*Statement #20 produced a statistically significant difference in responses between groups (.002).  Post hoc 
testing showed the difference to be between the pilot and RN. 
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APPENDIX C 
ANOVA 
One Way ANOVA 
 
 
 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Completing the mission 
is my highest priority 
Between 
Groups 
1.798 2 .899 .738 .480 
Within Groups 187.501 154 1.218   
Total 189.299 156    
Minimums are absolute.  
I do not push them. 
Between 
Groups 
2.629 2 1.315 3.423 .035 
Within Groups 59.523 155 .384   
Total 62.152 157    
The patient’s / 
customer’s needs come 
first 
Between 
Groups 
9.544 2 4.772 3.898 .022 
Within Groups 188.558 154 1.224   
Total 198.102 156    
I routinely review my 
base’s financial 
performance 
Between 
Groups 
5.334 2 2.667 1.649 .196 
Within Groups 249.074 154 1.617   
Total 254.408 156    
It is not my emergency Between 
Groups 
3.964 2 1.982 1.515 .223 
Within Groups 202.745 155 1.308   
Total 206.709 157    
I would duck below 
minimums to complete 
the mission 
Between 
Groups 
.840 2 .420 1.046 .354 
Within Groups 62.254 155 .402   
Total 63.095 157    
I worry about the 
possibility of my base 
being closed because of 
poor performance 
Between 
Groups 
6.984 2 3.492 2.382 .096 
Within Groups 225.793 154 1.466   
Total 232.777 156    
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During the past month I 
have asked about a 
patient’s payer status 
Between 
Groups 
5.542 2 2.771 1.825 .165 
Within Groups 235.401 155 1.519   
Total 240.943 157    
I never turn down a 
flight on the basis of 
radar data alone; I 
prefer to actually see 
what it actually going 
on. 
Between 
Groups 
8.404 2 4.202 3.907 .022 
Within Groups 164.570 153 1.076   
Total 172.974 155 
   
I would consider dipping 
into my fuel reserve in 
order to successfully 
complete the flight 
Between 
Groups 
1.584 2 .792 1.168 .314 
Within Groups 103.775 153 .678   
Total 105.359 155    
Regulations do not 
promote safety 
Between 
Groups 
5.075 2 2.538 2.217 .112 
Within Groups 175.149 153 1.145   
Total 180.224 155    
The base’s financial 
performance is not my 
problem 
Between 
Groups 
16.509 2 8.255 6.336 .002 
Within Groups 201.928 155 1.303   
Total 218.437 157    
Just because another 
aircraft has turned down 
the flight is no reason to 
think we cannot do it. 
Between 
Groups 
13.237 2 6.618 5.636 .004 
Within Groups 180.852 154 1.174   
Total 194.089 156    
Turning down a flight 
equates to revenue we 
cannot afford to lose. 
Between 
Groups 
1.581 2 .790 1.007 .368 
Within Groups 120.086 153 .785   
Total 121.667 155    
They do not call us 
unless they need us.  If 
they call it is our 
responsibility to get the 
job done 
Between 
Groups 
1.305 2 .652 .669 .514 
Within Groups 150.173 154 .975   
Total 151.478 156    
I do not accept a flight 
unless I am sure we can 
complete it safely and 
within the standards 
Between 
Groups 
.230 2 .115 .317 .729 
Within Groups 55.846 154 .363   
Total 56.076 156    
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I do not know whether 
or not my base is in the 
black (making a profit) 
Between 
Groups 
1.643 2 .822 .548 .579 
Within Groups 229.254 153 1.498   
Total 230.897 155    
If the weather is 
marginal, I do not mind 
waiting till it clears; the 
patient will still be there 
Between 
Groups 
.015 2 .007 .010 .990 
Within Groups 111.348 154 .723   
Total 111.363 156    
During the last year I 
have deviated from the 
operations manual in 
order to complete a 
flight 
Between 
Groups 
1.822 2 .911 1.177 .311 
Within Groups 117.688 152 .774   
Total 119.510 154    
The Emergency 
Operations Center is a 
resource, I am PIC, I 
decide whether or not to 
accept a flight 
Between 
Groups 
20.059 2 10.030 6.731 .002 
Within Groups 210.101 141 1.490   
Total 230.160 143    
Table 23: One Way ANOVA 
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APPENDIX D 
POST HOC TUKEY/BONFERRONI 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
(I) 
Certification 
(J) 
Certification 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Completing the 
mission is my 
highest priority 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .261 .219 .460 -.26 .78 
EMT-P .044 .209 .976 -.45 .54 
RN Pilot -.261 .219 .460 -.78 .26 
EMT-P -.217 .241 .642 -.79 .35 
EMT-P Pilot -.044 .209 .976 -.54 .45 
RN .217 .241 .642 -.35 .79 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .261 .219 .707 -.27 .79 
EMT-P .044 .209 1.000 -.46 .55 
RN Pilot -.261 .219 .707 -.79 .27 
EMT-P -.217 .241 1.000 -.80 .37 
EMT-P Pilot -.044 .209 1.000 -.55 .46 
RN .217 .241 1.000 -.37 .80 
Minimums are 
absolute.  I do 
not push them. 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN -.319
*
 .123 .027 -.61 -.03 
EMT-P -.140 .117 .460 -.42 .14 
RN Pilot .319
*
 .123 .027 .03 .61 
EMT-P .179 .136 .384 -.14 .50 
EMT-P Pilot .140 .117 .460 -.14 .42 
RN -.179 .136 .384 -.50 .14 
Bonferroni Pilot RN -.319
*
 .123 .030 -.62 -.02 
EMT-P -.140 .117 .705 -.42 .14 
RN Pilot .319
*
 .123 .030 .02 .62 
EMT-P .179 .136 .562 -.15 .51 
EMT-P Pilot .140 .117 .705 -.14 .42 
RN -.179 .136 .562 -.51 .15 
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The patient’s / 
customer’s needs 
come first 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN -.160 .219 .747 -.68 .36 
EMT-P -.582
*
 .210 .017 -1.08 -.09 
RN Pilot .160 .219 .747 -.36 .68 
EMT-P -.422 .242 .192 -1.00 .15 
EMT-P Pilot .582
*
 .210 .017 .09 1.08 
RN .422 .242 .192 -.15 1.00 
Bonferroni Pilot RN -.160 .219 1.000 -.69 .37 
EMT-P -.582
*
 .210 .019 -1.09 -.07 
RN Pilot .160 .219 1.000 -.37 .69 
EMT-P -.422 .242 .249 -1.01 .16 
EMT-P Pilot .582
*
 .210 .019 .07 1.09 
RN .422 .242 .249 -.16 1.01 
I routinely review 
my base’s 
financial 
performance 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN -.385 .254 .286 -.99 .22 
EMT-P -.355 .240 .305 -.92 .21 
RN Pilot .385 .254 .286 -.22 .99 
EMT-P .030 .280 .994 -.63 .69 
EMT-P Pilot .355 .240 .305 -.21 .92 
RN -.030 .280 .994 -.69 .63 
Bonferroni Pilot RN -.385 .254 .395 -1.00 .23 
EMT-P -.355 .240 .426 -.94 .23 
RN Pilot .385 .254 .395 -.23 1.00 
EMT-P .030 .280 1.000 -.65 .71 
EMT-P Pilot .355 .240 .426 -.23 .94 
RN -.030 .280 1.000 -.71 .65 
It is not my 
emergency 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .344 .226 .285 -.19 .88 
EMT-P -.053 .216 .968 -.56 .46 
RN Pilot -.344 .226 .285 -.88 .19 
EMT-P -.397 .250 .255 -.99 .20 
EMT-P Pilot .053 .216 .968 -.46 .56 
RN .397 .250 .255 -.20 .99 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .344 .226 .393 -.20 .89 
EMT-P -.053 .216 1.000 -.58 .47 
RN Pilot -.344 .226 .393 -.89 .20 
EMT-P -.397 .250 .345 -1.00 .21 
EMT-P Pilot .053 .216 1.000 -.47 .58 
RN .397 .250 .345 -.21 1.00 
I would duck 
below minimums 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .142 .125 .494 -.15 .44 
EMT-P .149 .120 .428 -.13 .43 
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to complete the 
mission 
RN Pilot -.142 .125 .494 -.44 .15 
EMT-P .007 .139 .999 -.32 .33 
EMT-P Pilot -.149 .120 .428 -.43 .13 
RN -.007 .139 .999 -.33 .32 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .142 .125 .774 -.16 .45 
EMT-P .149 .120 .644 -.14 .44 
RN Pilot -.142 .125 .774 -.45 .16 
EMT-P .007 .139 1.000 -.33 .34 
EMT-P Pilot -.149 .120 .644 -.44 .14 
RN -.007 .139 1.000 -.34 .33 
I worry about the 
possibility of my 
base being 
closed because 
of poor 
performance 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .352 .240 .310 -.22 .92 
EMT-P .468 .229 .106 -.07 1.01 
RN Pilot -.352 .240 .310 -.92 .22 
EMT-P .116 .265 .899 -.51 .74 
EMT-P Pilot -.468 .229 .106 -1.01 .07 
RN -.116 .265 .899 -.74 .51 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .352 .240 .435 -.23 .93 
EMT-P .468 .229 .129 -.09 1.02 
RN Pilot -.352 .240 .435 -.93 .23 
EMT-P .116 .265 1.000 -.52 .76 
EMT-P Pilot -.468 .229 .129 -1.02 .09 
RN -.116 .265 1.000 -.76 .52 
During the past 
month I have 
asked about a 
patient’s payer 
status 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .443 .244 .168 -.13 1.02 
EMT-P .024 .233 .994 -.53 .58 
RN Pilot -.443 .244 .168 -1.02 .13 
EMT-P -.419 .270 .269 -1.06 .22 
EMT-P Pilot -.024 .233 .994 -.58 .53 
RN .419 .270 .269 -.22 1.06 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .443 .244 .214 -.15 1.03 
EMT-P .024 .233 1.000 -.54 .59 
RN Pilot -.443 .244 .214 -1.03 .15 
EMT-P -.419 .270 .367 -1.07 .23 
EMT-P Pilot -.024 .233 1.000 -.59 .54 
RN .419 .270 .367 -.23 1.07 
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I never turn down 
a flight on the 
basis of radar 
data alone; I 
prefer to actually 
see what it 
actually going on. 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .385 .206 .150 -.10 .87 
EMT-P -.249 .198 .421 -.72 .22 
RN Pilot -.385 .206 .150 -.87 .10 
EMT-P -.634
*
 .228 .017 -1.17 -.09 
EMT-P Pilot .249 .198 .421 -.22 .72 
RN .634
*
 .228 .017 .09 1.17 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .385 .206 .190 -.11 .88 
EMT-P -.249 .198 .631 -.73 .23 
RN Pilot -.385 .206 .190 -.88 .11 
EMT-P -.634
*
 .228 .018 -1.19 -.08 
EMT-P Pilot .249 .198 .631 -.23 .73 
RN .634
*
 .228 .018 .08 1.19 
I would consider 
dipping into my 
fuel reserve in 
order to 
successfully 
complete the 
flight 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .249 .163 .282 -.14 .64 
EMT-P .071 .157 .893 -.30 .44 
RN Pilot -.249 .163 .282 -.64 .14 
EMT-P -.178 .181 .590 -.61 .25 
EMT-P Pilot -.071 .157 .893 -.44 .30 
RN .178 .181 .590 -.25 .61 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .249 .163 .388 -.15 .64 
EMT-P .071 .157 1.000 -.31 .45 
RN Pilot -.249 .163 .388 -.64 .15 
EMT-P -.178 .181 .984 -.62 .26 
EMT-P Pilot -.071 .157 1.000 -.45 .31 
RN .178 .181 .984 -.26 .62 
Regulations do 
not promote 
safety 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .451 .214 .092 -.06 .96 
EMT-P .149 .203 .744 -.33 .63 
RN Pilot -.451 .214 .092 -.96 .06 
EMT-P -.302 .236 .409 -.86 .26 
EMT-P Pilot -.149 .203 .744 -.63 .33 
RN .302 .236 .409 -.26 .86 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .451 .214 .111 -.07 .97 
EMT-P .149 .203 1.000 -.34 .64 
RN Pilot -.451 .214 .111 -.97 .07 
EMT-P -.302 .236 .607 -.87 .27 
EMT-P Pilot -.149 .203 1.000 -.64 .34 
RN .302 .236 .607 -.27 .87 
The base’s 
financial 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .803
*
 .226 .001 .27 1.34 
EMT-P .239 .216 .512 -.27 .75 
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performance is 
not my problem 
RN Pilot -.803
*
 .226 .001 -1.34 -.27 
EMT-P -.564 .250 .065 -1.16 .03 
EMT-P Pilot -.239 .216 .512 -.75 .27 
RN .564 .250 .065 -.03 1.16 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .803
*
 .226 .002 .26 1.35 
EMT-P .239 .216 .811 -.28 .76 
RN Pilot -.803
*
 .226 .002 -1.35 -.26 
EMT-P -.564 .250 .076 -1.17 .04 
EMT-P Pilot -.239 .216 .811 -.76 .28 
RN .564 .250 .076 -.04 1.17 
Just because 
another aircraft 
has turned down 
the flight is no 
reason to think 
we cannot do it. 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .719
*
 .215 .003 .21 1.23 
EMT-P .200 .205 .595 -.29 .69 
RN Pilot -.719
*
 .215 .003 -1.23 -.21 
EMT-P -.520 .237 .076 -1.08 .04 
EMT-P Pilot -.200 .205 .595 -.69 .29 
RN .520 .237 .076 -.04 1.08 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .719
*
 .215 .003 .20 1.24 
EMT-P .200 .205 .997 -.30 .70 
RN Pilot -.719
*
 .215 .003 -1.24 -.20 
EMT-P -.520 .237 .090 -1.09 .05 
EMT-P Pilot -.200 .205 .997 -.70 .30 
RN .520 .237 .090 -.05 1.09 
Turning down a 
flight equates to 
revenue we 
cannot afford to 
lose. 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .240 .175 .359 -.17 .66 
EMT-P .142 .170 .682 -.26 .54 
RN Pilot -.240 .175 .359 -.66 .17 
EMT-P -.098 .196 .870 -.56 .37 
EMT-P Pilot -.142 .170 .682 -.54 .26 
RN .098 .196 .870 -.37 .56 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .240 .175 .518 -.18 .66 
EMT-P .142 .170 1.000 -.27 .55 
RN Pilot -.240 .175 .518 -.66 .18 
EMT-P -.098 .196 1.000 -.57 .38 
EMT-P Pilot -.142 .170 1.000 -.55 .27 
RN .098 .196 1.000 -.38 .57 
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They do not call 
us unless they 
need us.  If they 
call it is our 
responsibility to 
get the job done 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .143 .195 .744 -.32 .61 
EMT-P .206 .188 .517 -.24 .65 
RN Pilot -.143 .195 .744 -.61 .32 
EMT-P .063 .217 .955 -.45 .58 
EMT-P Pilot -.206 .188 .517 -.65 .24 
RN -.063 .217 .955 -.58 .45 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .143 .195 1.000 -.33 .62 
EMT-P .206 .188 .822 -.25 .66 
RN Pilot -.143 .195 1.000 -.62 .33 
EMT-P .063 .217 1.000 -.46 .59 
EMT-P Pilot -.206 .188 .822 -.66 .25 
RN -.063 .217 1.000 -.59 .46 
I do not accept a 
flight unless I am 
sure we can 
complete it safely 
and within the 
standards 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN -.095 .119 .706 -.38 .19 
EMT-P -.033 .115 .955 -.30 .24 
RN Pilot .095 .119 .706 -.19 .38 
EMT-P .062 .132 .887 -.25 .38 
EMT-P Pilot .033 .115 .955 -.24 .30 
RN -.062 .132 .887 -.38 .25 
Bonferroni Pilot RN -.095 .119 1.000 -.38 .19 
EMT-P -.033 .115 1.000 -.31 .24 
RN Pilot .095 .119 1.000 -.19 .38 
EMT-P .062 .132 1.000 -.26 .38 
EMT-P Pilot .033 .115 1.000 -.24 .31 
RN -.062 .132 1.000 -.38 .26 
I do not know 
whether or not 
my base is in the 
black (making a 
profit) 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .254 .242 .548 -.32 .83 
EMT-P .085 .235 .930 -.47 .64 
RN Pilot -.254 .242 .548 -.83 .32 
EMT-P -.168 .271 .809 -.81 .47 
EMT-P Pilot -.085 .235 .930 -.64 .47 
RN .168 .271 .809 -.47 .81 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .254 .242 .890 -.33 .84 
EMT-P .085 .235 1.000 -.48 .65 
RN Pilot -.254 .242 .890 -.84 .33 
EMT-P -.168 .271 1.000 -.82 .49 
EMT-P Pilot -.085 .235 1.000 -.65 .48 
RN .168 .271 1.000 -.49 .82 
If the weather is 
marginal, I do not 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .023 .168 .990 -.38 .42 
EMT-P .014 .162 .996 -.37 .40 
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mind waiting till it 
clears; the 
patient will still be 
there 
RN Pilot -.023 .168 .990 -.42 .38 
EMT-P -.009 .187 .999 -.45 .43 
EMT-P Pilot -.014 .162 .996 -.40 .37 
RN .009 .187 .999 -.43 .45 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .023 .168 1.000 -.38 .43 
EMT-P .014 .162 1.000 -.38 .41 
RN Pilot -.023 .168 1.000 -.43 .38 
EMT-P -.009 .187 1.000 -.46 .44 
EMT-P Pilot -.014 .162 1.000 -.41 .38 
RN .009 .187 1.000 -.44 .46 
During the last 
year I have 
deviated from the 
operations 
manual in order 
to complete a 
flight 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .218 .176 .430 -.20 .63 
EMT-P .216 .169 .409 -.18 .62 
RN Pilot -.218 .176 .430 -.63 .20 
EMT-P -.002 .196 1.000 -.47 .46 
EMT-P Pilot -.216 .169 .409 -.62 .18 
RN .002 .196 1.000 -.46 .47 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .218 .176 .647 -.21 .64 
EMT-P .216 .169 .608 -.19 .62 
RN Pilot -.218 .176 .647 -.64 .21 
EMT-P -.002 .196 1.000 -.48 .47 
EMT-P Pilot -.216 .169 .608 -.62 .19 
RN .002 .196 1.000 -.47 .48 
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The Emergency 
Operations 
Center is a 
resource, I am 
PIC, I decide 
whether or not to 
accept a flight 
Tukey 
HSD 
Pilot RN .787
*
 .259 .008 .17 1.40 
EMT-P .710
*
 .242 .011 .14 1.28 
RN Pilot -.787
*
 .259 .008 -1.40 -.17 
EMT-P -.078 .291 .961 -.77 .61 
EMT-P Pilot -.710
*
 .242 .011 -1.28 -.14 
RN .078 .291 .961 -.61 .77 
Bonferroni Pilot RN .787
*
 .259 .008 .16 1.41 
EMT-P .710
*
 .242 .012 .12 1.30 
RN Pilot -.787
*
 .259 .008 -1.41 -.16 
EMT-P -.078 .291 1.000 -.78 .63 
EMT-P Pilot -.710
*
 .242 .012 -1.30 -.12 
RN .078 .291 1.000 -.63 .78 
Table 24: Post Hoc Tukey/Bonferroni  
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